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I. Introduction 
Sovereign immunity, the right of a sovereign to refuse to appear 
as a defendant in court, has been a principal topic of a recent 
Supreme Court focus on states' rights. Although the textual 
codification of state sovereign immunity, the Eleventh Amendment, 
by its terms prohibits only suits brought against a state in federal 
court by a citizen of another state or by a citizen of a foreign nation, 
the Court has pronounced the states immune from a far more 
expansive list of suits: lawsuits brought by citizens of the same state,1 
by foreign nations,2 by Indian tribes,3 by public corporations,4 by a 
*Attorney, United States Department of Commerce. The views expressed herein are 
mine alone and do not necessarily represent those of any other person or entity. 
1. See Hans v. Lousiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
2. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934). 
3. See Blatchford v. Native Viii. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991); see also Idaho v. 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261,268-69 (1997) (reaffirming Blatchford). 
4. See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900). 
[721] 
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government when a private party is the real party in interest,5 by 
private parties under admiralty law,6 by private parties under various 
Article I legislation in federal court,7 by private parties under various 
Article I legislation in state courts,8 by private parties for state law 
claims in federal court under pendent or supplemental jurisdiction,9 
and by private parties before agency administrative proceedings.10 
On the other hand, the Court has refused to afford states 
immunity from suits brought under appropriate legislation enforcing 
the Fourteenth Amendment/ 1 from appeals to the Supreme Court 
from state courts,12 from suits brought by the federal government or 
its agencies,13 from suits brought by states,14 from suits by private 
parties in a different state's court,15 from suits where the state has 
5. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972); see also Maryland v. 
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 745 n.21 (1981) ("[A]n original action between two States only 
violates the Eleventh Amendment if the plaintiff State is actually suing to recover for 
injuries to specific individuals."). 
6. See In reNew York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921). 
7. See Coil. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666 (1999) (Trademarks); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coli. Sav. 
Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (Interstate Commerce Clause and Patent Clause); Seminole 
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Indian Commerce Clause). 
8. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
9. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). 
10. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S 743 (2002). 
11. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
12. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); see also McKesson Corp. v. 
Fla. Alcohol & Tobacco Div., 496 U.S. 18, 26-29 (1990) (reaffirming Cohens). 
13. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892) (explaining that the peace of the 
Union might be threatened were not federal courts empowered to adjudicate 
controversies between states and the federal government); see also United States v. 
Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965) (reaffirming Texas). 
14. See South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904); Rhode Island v. 
Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838) (asserting jurisdiction over a border dispute 
between two states). 
15. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979). Although the Supreme Court has not 
explicitly retreated from Hall, the reasoning underlying the decision has been complicated 
by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), and its progeny. Much of Hall's 
rationale is based on the finding that the sovereign immunity of one State in another 
State's courts has no constitutional dimension. The dissenters in Hall disagreed with the 
majority on that point, a point emphatically made law by Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 
(1999). Compare Hall, 440 U.S. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I must agree with the 
Court that if the judgment of the California Court of Appeal is to be reversed, a 
constitutional source for Nevada's sovereign immunity must be found. I would find that 
source not in an express provision of the Constitution but in a guarantee that is implied as 
an essential component of federalism."); and id. at 439 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Art. 
III and the Eleventh Amendment are built on important concepts of sovereignty that do 
not find expression in the literal terms of those provisions, but which are of constitutional 
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waived its immunity/6 from suits against state officers for prospective 
injunctive relief,17 and (implicitly) from suits by any authorized party 
under appropriate Spending Clause legislation.18 
No coherent theory of the applicable state sovereign immunity· 
readily arises from this bizarre quagmire. Alexander Hamilton 
famously, but rather incompletely, gave his explanation for the 
applicability of state sovereign immunity: "Unless, therefore, there is 
a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will 
remain with the States."19 The Court has long adopted this opaque 
f 'd 20 re erence as a gm epost. 
dimension because their derogation would undermine the logic of the constitutional 
scheme."), with Alden, 527 U.S. at 733 ("[T]he structure and history of the Constitution 
make clear that the immunity exists today by constitutional design."). Moreover, a state's 
supposed indignity of being forced to appear as a defendant, a rationale used by the court 
to uphold immunity in federal courts, a state's own courts, and federal adjudicative 
tribunals, see In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887); Alden, 527 U.S. at 748-49; Fed. Mar. 
Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 759-60 (2002), would be no less profound 
in a sister state's courts. The Court will have an opportunity to overrule or affirm Nevada 
v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), this term in Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, No. 02-42 
(U.S. 2002). Amici have urged the Court to topple Hall. See Amicus Brief of the States of 
Fla., Alaska, Colo., Conn., Del., Haw., Ill., Ind., Me., Md., Mich., Miss., Mont., N.D., Ohio, 
Utah, Vt., Va., W.Va., and the Commonwealth of P.R., 2002 WL 31863327 (Dec. 9, 2002). 
16. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1887). Recently, the Court affirmed that the 
state's voluntary removal of a case to federal court constituted a waiver of sovereign 
immunity. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613 (2002). 
17. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-160 (1908); see also Verizon Md., Inc. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635 (2002) (reaffirming Young). 
18. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (affirming Congress' ability to 
regulate, under the Spending Clause, matters expressly reserved to the states under the 
Twenty-First Amendment); Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947) 
(holding the Tenth Amendment no bar to Spending Clause legislation otherwise 
unauthorized by Article I enumerated powers); see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 755 (stating 
that Congress has the authority and means to seek a state's voluntary consent to private 
suits and citing Dole). Spending Clause "abrogation" is, according to the Court, more 
accurately described as a state's voluntary waiver of its sovereign immunity in exchange 
for some federal financial incentive. Of course, the spending power is not unlimited. If 
the financial incentive is so great as to be coercive, i.e., when "pressure turns into 
compulsion," Spending Clause legislation may not be valid. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 
301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937); accord College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,683 (1999). 
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
20. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Alden, 527 U.S. 
at 730-31; Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997); Blatchford v. 
Native Viii. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 781 (1991); McKesson Corp. v. Fla. Alcohol & 
Tobacco Div., 496 U.S. 18, 28-29 (1990); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19 
(1989); Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 33, 40 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Atascadero State Hosp. v. 
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 
89, 99 (1984); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 440 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 
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If Hamilton had explained a little more about what he meant by 
that statement, perhaps it would not be difficult to distill a 
recognizable rule.21 Unfortunately, the historical record on state 
sovereign immunity is remotely barren, and the Court's ad hoc 
development of state sovereign immunity under Hamilton's aegis has 
not fared well.22 In Part II, I briefly recount the Court's state 
662 n.9 (1974); Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep't of Pub. Health & 
Welfare of Mo., 411 U.S. 279, 317 (1973); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 
313, 322-23 (1934); South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 318 (1904); United 
States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890); cf 
Cohens v. Virgnia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 380 (1821) {Marshall, C.J.) ("And if a State has 
surrendered any portion of its sovereignty, the question whether a liability to suit be a part 
of this portion, depends on the instrument by which the surrender is made. If, upon a just 
construction of that instrument, it shall appear that the State has submitted to be sued, 
then it has parted with this sovereign right of judging in every case on the justice of its own 
pretensions, and has entrusted that power to a tribunal in whose impartiality it confides."); 
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. {2 Dall.) 419, 435 {1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting) ("Every State 
in the Union in every instance where its sovereignty has not been delegated to the United 
States, I consider to be completely sovereign, as the United States are in respect to the 
powers surrendered. The United States are sovereign as to all the powers of Government 
actually surrendered: Each State in the Union is sovereign as to all the powers 
reserved."). The Court skipped a beat with Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 
(1996), which only mentioned Hamilton's phrase in quoted passing. See Seminole Tribe, 
517 U.S. at 68. 
21. Justice Breyer has criticized reliance on the "plan of the convention" for its ill-
defined parameters. See Federal Mar., 535 U.S. 743, 772 {Breyer, J., dissenting) 
("Considered purely as constitutional text, these words-constitutional design, system of 
federalism, and plan of the convention-suffer several defects. Their language is highly 
abstract, making them difficult to apply. They invite differing interpretations at least as 
much as do the Constitution's own broad liberty-protecting phrases, such as due process of 
law or the word liberty itself. And compared to these latter phrases, they suffer the 
additional disadvantage that they do not actually appear anywhere in the Constitution."). 
22. See, e.g., Susan Randall, Sovereign Immunity and the Uses of History, 81 NEB. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (2002) ("The history of sovereign immunity in the United States is a history of 
mistakes."); Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1652-53 & nn. 400-02 (2002) (citing scholarly criticism); Scott 
Fruehwald, The Principled and Unprincipled Grounds of the New Federalism: A Call for 
Detachment in the Constitutional Adjudication of Federalism, 53 MERCER L. REV. 811, 
836-63 (2002) (criticizing the majority's state sovereign immunity jurisprudence as 
"unprincipled"); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, 75 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 859, 859-60 (2000) (noting two conflicting strains of justification for the 
federalism doctrine); Ann Althouse, The Alden Trilogy: Still Searching for a Way to 
Enforce Federalism, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 631, 647 (2000) (analyzing Alden and concluding 
that the Court's federalism underpinnings to state sovereign immunity permit "the 
national interest [to] win whenever we think it is important enough"); Daniel J. Meltzer, 
State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1011, 1012 {2000); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 7.1 {3d ed. 1999) 
(recording that the Court's Eleventh Amendment case law has been maligned as 
"tortuous" and "hodgepodge"); Eric S. Johnson, Note, Unsheathing Alexander's Sword: 
Lapides v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 
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sovereign immunity jurisprudence. 
The next logical question, and one with which recent 
commentary has toyed,23 is: What are the parameters of state 
sovereign immunity? The Court has made clear that certain 
provisions of Article I contain no authority for overriding state 
sovereign immunity, while at least one other provision, the 
Fourteenth Amendment, permits Congress to abrogate the states' 
sovereign immunity. How is this constitutional line drawn? It is 
temporally bound?24 In other words, are only certain Amendments 
1051, 1052 (2002) ("The conflicting, inconsistent, and contrived rationales delineating the 
contours of this Eleventh Amendment Gordian knot often obscure rather than illuminate 
the boundaries the Eleventh Amendment seeks to define."); see also Wis. Dep't of Corr. v. 
Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 394 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing the state sovereign 
immunity doctrine as a strange "hybrid"). But see William H. Pryor, Jr., Madison's 
Double Security: In Defense of Federalism, the Separation of Powers, and the Rehnquist 
Court, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1167, 1169 (2002) ("The jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court in 
matters of federalism is principled, coherent, and true to the text and structure of the 
Constitution."). 
Professor Evan Caminker metaphorically describes the Supreme Court's vision of the 
"plan of the convention" as anthropomorphic states sitting around a board room table, 
with the United States as the chairman, trading sovereign immunities pursuant to some 
major deal about to go through. See Evan H. Caminker, State Immunity Waivers for Suits 
by the United States, 98 MICH. L. REV. 92, 113 (1999). Years ago, Chief Justice John 
Marshall disavowed such a vision: 
The assent of the States, in their sovereign capacity, is implied in calling a 
convention, and thus submitting that instrument to the people. But the people 
were at perfect liberty to accept or reject it; and their act was final. It required 
not the affirmance, and could not be negatived, by the State governments .... 
The government of the Union, then ... is, emphatically, and truly, a government 
of the people. 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,404-05 (1819). But see THE FEDERALIST 
No. 39 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (suggesting that the assent was given 
by state conventions with significant state presence). Patrick Henry made the same 
observation, albeit in protestation: "[W]hat right had [the Framers] to say, We, the 
People... . [W]ho authorised them to speak the language of We, the People, instead of 
We, the States?" 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, FEDERALIST AND 
ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER 
RATIFICATION 595, 596 (Bernard Bailyn ed. 1993) [hereinafter BAIL YN'S DEBATES). 
23. A few scholars have briefly acknowledged the issue. See, e.g., Carlos Manuel 
Vazquez, Treaties and the Eleventh Amendment, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 713, 726 n.69 (2002); 
Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated 
Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1259, 1260-61 (2001). Professor Susan Bandes, the one 
scholar to directly address the issue, argues that state sovereign immunity could be a 
clause-bound inquiry under the current Court majority's understanding. Susan Bandes, 
Treaties, Sovereign Immunity, and "The Plan of the Convention," 42 VA. J. lNT'L L. 743, 
747 (2002). As this article demonstrates, I reach a different conclusion. 
24. The Court was clearly concerned with timing. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66 
(citing Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 42 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Although courts following 
Seminole Tribe have cited chronology as the justification for its holding, see, e.g., 
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enacted after the Eleventh Amendment free from absolute 
subservience to state sovereign immunity? Or, does it divide the 
original Constitution and its Amendments, meaning that state 
sovereign immunity permeates the original Constitution but does not 
infiltrate certain Amendments, even those ratified before the 
Eleventh? Is state sovereign immunity article-bound, which would 
prohibit Congress from subjecting the states to private suit under any 
Article I power, but leave open the possibility that Article II or 
Article IV might overcome immunity? Or perhaps it is clause-bound, 
which would really provide no rule at all, and require a clause-by-
clause analysis of Hamilton's plan of the convention? Part III 
answers that the state sovereign immunity envisioned by the Court is 
an Amendment-driven inquiry: it is inviolable to the extent of the 
original Constitution, and even such nationalistic powers as Congress' 
Article I War Powers or the Treaty Power of Article II cater to it. 
However, the Fourteenth Amendment changed the rules. Thus 
certain Amendments may enable its abrogation, even those ratified 
before the Eleventh Amendment if their precepts were incorporated 
into the Fourteenth. 
Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389, 391 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J.) (interpreting 
Seminole Tribe to hold that the Commerce Power cannot limit Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity because it was ratified before the Eleventh Amendment), vacated on 
other grounds, 165 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), the Court actually did not firmly 
root its holding on those grounds. 
The Seminole Tribe majority was likely quite wary of Justice Brennan's cogent observation 
that timing was irrelevant if the principle behind the Eleventh Amendment was something 
more ancient than the text of the Amendment itself. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 17-18 
(criticizing Justice Scalia's dissent). Additional flaws weaken the timing argument. For 
example, if the Fourteenth Amendment permits Congress to subject states to suit despite 
the immunity found in the Eleventh Amendment simply because of chronology, it should 
also permit Congress to authorize, as a means of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, 
cruel and unusual punishments otherwise unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. 
No one seriously takes this position. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE 
SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, 573-74 (1990). Moreover, the 
Fourteenth Amendment framers could not have intended to override states' immunity 
under federal law because at the time the Eleventh Amendment had not been interpreted 
to extend that far. See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign 
Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 21. Finally, Seminole Tribe did not address the logical 
corollary that the Fourteenth Amendment may also have altered the rest of the 
Constitution in ways previously superceded by the Eleventh Amendment. See Jackson, 
supra note 23 at 1259 (suggesting that the Fourteenth Amendment could be read in 
conjunction with the rest of the Constitution as promulgating a new federal-state balance 
to the entire document). 
Summer 2002] METES AND BOUNDS 727 
II. The Development of State Sovereign Immunity 
Sovereign immunity has enjoyed a firm place in history for many 
centuries.25 The British heritage derived from the presumption that 
the King could do no wrong26 and had supremacy over the judiciary.27 
The American colonists, of course, dispensed with both justifications 
when they declared their independence, rejected royalty, and 
established a republic.28 Nevertheless, in the matriculation from 
colonies to states, the states became endowed with some form of that 
sovereign right of immunity, either directly inherited from the crown, 
or bestowed by the liberated colonists.29 By ratifying the 
25. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414 (1979). 
26. See id. at 415 n.7 (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 246 ("The king, 
moreover, is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of thinking wrong; he can never 
mean to do an improper thing.")). It has been argued that this axiom originally meant that 
the sovereign was not permitted to do wrong, rather than was not held accountable for acts 
otherwise deemed wrongful. See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: 
Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1963); David. E. Engdahl, Immunity and 
Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 3 (1972). 
Others have suggested that the phrase meant that the wrongful acts of the King's 
subordinates would not be attributable to the King. Vazquez, supra note 23, at 866. 
27. See Hall, 440 U.S. at 414-15 (explaining sovereign immunity on the basis that no 
tribunal could be higher than the King). 
28. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE <J]13 (U.S. 1776) ("The history of the 
present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having 
in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these states."). In designing 
the Constitution, the Framers adopted and discarded various English political and legal 
postulates with a discriminating eye. See, e.g., Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137, 
144 (1829) (Story, J.) ("The common law of England is not to be taken in all respects to be 
that of America. Our ancestors brought with them its general principles, and claimed it as 
their birthright; but they brought with them and adopted only that portion which was 
applicable to their situation."); Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the 
Doctrine, The Supreme Court 1999 Term, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 115 (2000) (explaining 
that the Framers broke with English tradition in a variety of ways, including English 
understanding of sovereignty). For a variety of reasons, the colonists' desire to depart 
from many traditional English views had been simmering well before independence. See, 
e.g., PAUL REINSCH, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE EARLY AMERICAN COLONIES 58 
(1899). The current Court majority, however, has taken the position that the Framers did 
not depart from traditional notions of state sovereign immunity. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 
706, 715-16 (1999) ("Although the American people had rejected other aspects of English 
political theory, the doctrine that a sovereign could not be sued without its consent was 
universal in the States when the Constitution was drafted and ratified."). 
29. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 ("[T]he States' immunity from suit is a fundamental 
aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the 
Constitution, and which they retain today .... "). It is a debatable question whether the 
states inherited sovereignty directly upon independence or whether the people first 
inherited sovereignty and then ceded it to the states. For one famous case illustrating the 
Court's struggle with this concept, see Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796). One 
commentator has suggested that the states' immunity is not derived from English nations 
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Constitution, however, the states agreed to its parameters and in the 
process ceded much of their sovereign authority, including some of 
the control over their sovereign immunity, to the new federal 
government.30 
While it is clear that the states surrendered some of their 
sovereign immunity in ratifying the Constitution, it is equally· clear 
that the states did not cede all of their sovereign immunity. The 
question which has entangled just about everyone confronting the 
issue is which parts the states surrendered.31 
The question is framed by Article III of the Constitution, which 
states, in part: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, 
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, 
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their 
Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime 
Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall 
be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-
between a State and Citizens of another State;-between 
Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same 
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and 
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, 
Citizens or Subjects.32 
Some Founders argued that this section, which extends the 
judicial power to controversies "between a State and Citizens of 
another State," permits certain private suits against states.33 Others, 
at all but is rather a novel American creation. See Alfred Hill, In Defense of Our Law of 
Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C. L. REV. 485,489 (2001) ("[O]ur conception of the doctrine is 
seriously skewed if we conceive of it as deriving from English law. We derived it 
independently, in the same way as did England-and Italy and Japan."). 
30. See Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. 397, 407 (1871) 
(The Constitution ... was not framed merely to guard the States against danger 
from abroad, but chiefly to secure union and harmony at home; and to 
accomplish this end it was deemed necessary, when the Constitution was framed, 
that many of the rights of sovereignty which the States then possessed should be 
ceded to the General government; and that in the sphere of action assigned to it, 
it should be supreme and strong enough to execute its own laws by its own 
tribunals, without interruption from a State, or from State authorities.). 
31. Cf Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 33 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
("What is subject to greater dispute, however, is how much sovereign immunity was 
implicitly eliminated by what Hamilton called the 'plan of the convention."'). 
32. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2, cl.l. 
33. See, e.g., 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 207 (J. Elliot ed., 1876) [hereinafter 
ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (Edmund Randolph) ("I admire that part [of the Constitution] which 
forces Virginia to pay her debts."); 3 id. at 491 (James Wilson) ("When a citizen has a 
controversy with another state, there ought to be a tribunal where both parties may stand 
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most notably Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John 
Marshall, argued that Article III did not extend jurisdiction to suits 
brought against states by individuals.34 Whatever the original 
on a just and equal footing."); 3 id. at 526-27 (George Mason) (maligning the Constitution 
for enabling the "state to be brought to the bar of justice like a delinquent individual"); 3 
id. at 543 (Patrick Henry) ("What says the paper? That it shall have cognizance of 
controversies between a state and citizens of another state, without discriminating 
between plaintiff and defendant."); 3 id. at 549 (Edmund Pendleton) ("The impossibility 
of calling a sovereign state before the jurisdiction of another sovereign state, shows the 
propriety and necessity of vesting this tribunal with the decision of controversies to which 
a state shall be a party."); 3 id. at 566-67 (Grayson) ("My honorable friend, whom I much 
respect, said that the consent of the parties must be previously obtained .... (I]t is not so 
with our states. It is fixed in the Constitution that they shall become parties."); 3 id. at 573 
(Edmund Randolph) ("I think ... that any doubt respecting the construction that a state 
may be plaintiff, and not defendant, is taken away by the words where a state shall be a 
party."); 3 id. at 637-38 (Tyler) ("No gentlemen here can give such a construction of 
[Article III] as will give general satisfaction."); 4 id. at 205-06 (Lenoir) ("This state has 
made a contract with its citizens. The public securities and certificates I allude to. These 
may be negotiated to men who live in other states. Should that be the case, these 
gentlemen will have demands against this state on that account."); 2 THE COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST 245 (Federal Farmer) (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (objecting that the 
Consituttion enables suits against states); 2 id. at 245 (Federal Farmer) (presupposing that 
a private individual could bring suit against a state); 2 id. at 429-31 (Brutus) ("[Article III] 
is improper, because it subjects a state to answer in a court of law, to the suit of an 
individual. This is humiliating and degrading to a government, and, what I believe, the 
supreme authority of no state ever submitted to."); 1 BAILYN'S DEBATES, supra note 22, 
at 673-74 (Agrippa) ("This power extends to all cases between a state and citizens of 
another state. Hence a citizen, possessed of the notes of another state, may bring his 
action .... "); J. MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 157 (1961) (quoting a letter invoking the 
fear that Article III would expose the states to suit by individual creditors); 14 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 72 (J. 
Kaminski & G. Saladino eds., 1983) (contrasting the ability of the states to oppress their 
own citizens without judicial redress but not diverse citizens); see also Randall, supra note 
22, at 47 ("Apart from Madison and Marshall in the Virgina ratification debates, the 
recorded comments of every other participant in the ratification debates-Federalist and 
Antifederalist alike-show that they read the Constitution to extend the national judicial 
power to cases brought against the states by diverse citizens.") (footnote omitted). The 
New York Convention proposed the following amendment to Article III: "nothing in the 
Constitution now under consideration contained is to be construed to authorize any suit to 
be brought against any state, in any manner whatever." 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra, at 
409. The Conventions of Virginia, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and New 
Hampshire also proposed similar amendments. See William A. Fletcher, A Historical 
Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction ofan Affirmative 
Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 
1033, 1051-52 (1983). None was adopted. 
34. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961) ("It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the 
suit of an individual without its consent."); 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 33, at 555 
(John Marshall) ("I hope that no gentleman will think that a state will be called at the bar 
of the federal court . . . . It is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power shall be 
dragged before a court. The intent is, to enable states to recover claims of individuals 
residing in other states."); 3 id. at 533 (James Madison) ("It is not in the power of 
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meaning, if there was one at all,35 the language was adopted and 
ratified. 
The Court was quick to pick up the state sovereign immunity 
debate.36 In 1793, the Court decided Chisholm v. Georgia,37 a suit 
under state common law brought by a citizen of South Carolina to 
recover a debt against the State of Georgia. The suit clearly fell 
within the literal language of that section of Article III, establishing 
federal court jurisdiction over controversies between a state and 
citizens of another state.3M Nevertheless, Georgia argued that the 
Court lacked jurisdiction over it as a sovereign state.39 
Justice James Iredell agreed.40 Although conceding that 
Congress could subject the states to suit under the express terms of 
individuals to call any state into court. The only operation it can have is that, if a state 
should wish to bring a suit against a citizen, it must be brought before the federal court."); 
3 id. at 329 (New York Convention) ("[T]he judicial power of the United States, in cases 
in which a state may be a party, does not ... authorize any suit by any person against a 
state .... "); 3 id. at 336 (Rhode Island Convention) (same). 
35. It is entirely possible that some states ratified believing Article III permitted suits 
against them, while other states ratified trusting the statements of Madison, Marshall, and 
Hamilton. After all, by the time Hamilton's statements in The Federalist were published 
on January 9, 1788, five states-Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, and 
Connecticut-had already ratified the Constitution. Joan Meyler, A Matter of 
Misinterpretation, State Sovereign Immunity, and Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence: The 
Supreme Court's Reformation of the Constitution in Seminole Tribe and its Progeny, 45 
HOW. L.J. 77, 86 n.33 (2001). By the time Madison spoke at the Virginia convention on 
June 21, 1788, four more states-Massachusetts, Maryland, South Carolina, and New 
Hampshire-had already ratified the Constitution. ld. Still other states may have ratified 
the Constitution without ever coming to a definitive determination regarding the effect of 
Article III on state sovereign immunity. See CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH 
AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 27-40 (1972) (concluding that Pennsylvania, 
Massachusetts, Virginia, New York, North Carolina and Rhode Island failed to reach a 
definitive determination regarding whether state sovereign immunity survived Article III). 
Indeed, at the Virginia Convention, Edmund Randolph stated: "It is said to be disgraceful 
[to name a state as a defendant]. What would be the disgrace? Would it not be that 
Virginia, after eight states had adopted the government, none of which opposed the 
federal jurisdiction in this case, rejected it on this account?" 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra 
note 33, at 573 (Edmund Randolph). For more on the states' understandings of Article 
III, see Randall, supra note 22, at 54-61. 
36. Private suits against the states were filed during this time period in sufficient 
numbers to suggest that a significant portion of the public believed-or, at least, hoped-
that such suits were permitted by the Constitution. See 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 1-5 (Maeva Marcus et al. 
eds., 1994) (noting that nine private suits against states were litigated in the 1790s). 
37. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
38. See U.S. CONST. art. Ill,§ 2, cl. l. 
39. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 419 (statement of Robert Forsyth). 
40. See id. at 449 (Iredell, J ., dissenting). 
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Article III,41 Justice Iredell concluded that Congress had not chosen 
to do so with the Judiciary Act, the jurisdictional statute 
implementing Article III, which limited jurisdiction to that "agreeable 
to the principles and usages of law."42 Iredell thus found himself with 
a case which turned, in his mind, on whether subjecting a state to 
private suit was contemplated by that language in the Judiciary Act.43 
To determine whether suits against states were "agreeable to the 
principles and usages of law," Iredell returned to "the principles of 
the pre-existent laws, which must remain in force till superceded by 
others,"44 also known as the common law, which controls in the 
absence of legislation to the contrary.45 He recognized that English 
common law directed that no remedy could be sought against the 
sovereign,46 and, after an extensive analysis of the English common 
law tradition of sovereign immunity, he inferred that the American 
states inherited this relic.47 For Iredell, state sovereign immunity was 
alive and incorporated (or, at least, left unabridged) by the Judiciary 
Act, and therefore Georgia was not amenable to suit.48 
In a final statement which he admitted to be dictum,49 Iredell 
41. See id. at 435-36 (Iredell, J., dissenting) ("[T]he general Government has a 
Judicial Authority in regard to such subjects of controversy, and the Legislature of the 
United States may pass all laws necessary to give such Judicial Authority its proper effect. 
So far as States under the Constitution can be made legally liable to this authority, so far 
to be sure they are subordinate to the authority of the United States, and their individual 
sovereignty is in this respect limited."). 
42. /d. at 434 (Iredell, J ., dissenting). 
43. See id. at 449 (Iredell, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens has argued that Justice 
Iredell essentially relied on statutory construction, rather than on constitutional 
interpretation. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 78-81 (1996) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). His view joins unlikely bedfellows. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 
491 U.S. 1, 36 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recognizing that "it was the statutory ground of 
interpretation of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 80, rather than the 
constitutional ground, that Justice Iredell had relied upon in his dissent in Chisholm"). 
44. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 437 (Iredell, J., dissenting). 
45. See id. at 435 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (describing the common law as "a law which I 
presume is the ground-work of the laws in every State in the Union, and which I consider, 
so far as it is applicable to the Peculiar circumstances of the country, and where no special 
act of Legislation controls it, to be in force in each State, as it existed in England, 
(unaltered by any statute) at the time of the first settlement of the country"). 
46. See id. (Iredell, J., dissenting). 
47. See id. at 437-49 (Iredell, J., dissenting). 
48. See id. at 449 (Iredell, J., dissenting) ("My opinion being, that even if the 
Constitution would admit of the exercise of such a power, a new law is necessary for the 
purpose, since no part of the existing law applies, this alone is sufficient to justify my 
determination in the present case."). 
49. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 450 (Iredell, J., dissenting) ("This 
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commented: 
[M)y present opinion is strongly against any construction of [the 
Constitution), which will admit, under any circumstances, a 
compulsive suit against a state for the recovery of money. I 
think every word in the Constitution may have its full effect 
without involving this consequence, and that nothing but 
express words, or an insurmountable implication (neither of 
which I consider, can be found in this case) would authorize the 
deduction of so high a power. 5° 
Justice Iredell's views did not prevail, at least not then. The other 
four Justices found that both the Constitution and the Judiciary Act 
established the Court's jurisdiction over Georgia despite the state's 
claim of immunity.51 
The reaction to Chisholm, in the form of the Eleventh 
Amendment, was swift and decisive.52 Whereas Chisholm had held 
opinion I hold, however, with all the reserve proper for one, which, according to my 
sentiments in this case, may be deemed in some measure extra-judicial."). 
50. /d. at 449-50 (Iredell, J., dissenting). 
51. The Justices issued their opinions seriatim. Justice John Blair confined his 
analysis to the Constitution, and, in accordance with the literal language of Article III, he 
found jurisdiction. See id. at 450-51 (Blair, J.). Justice James Wilson, part of the five-
member committee that introduced the language of Article III into the Constitution, 
echoed the extreme stance of popular sovereignty he espoused in the Pennsylvania 
ratification debates: that the people, rather than the states, were the font of sovereignty. 
See id. at 457 (Wilson, J.). That the people had exercised their sovereign prerogative to 
subject their state governments to suit was, to Wilson, evident both from the clear text of 
Article III and from the logical step that if the people could be hauled into court, then 
entities of lesser sovereignty, such as the states, could as well. See id. at 465-66 (Wilson, 
J.). Justice William Cushing reasoned that the Union's design, as a practical matter, was 
most appropriately interpreted as withholding state sovereign immunity. See id. at 467-68 
(Cushing, J.). Chief Justice John Jay delivered the final opinion in a synthesis of the 
previous three concurrants. Like Wilson, Jay believed the Crown's sovereignty to pass to 
the people, rather than to the colonies or the states, and that their amenability to suit 
undermined state immunity from suit. And, like Cushing, Jay recognized that the design 
of a federal government could be most effective when states were subservient to a 
supreme national power. However, like Blair, he resorted to the text of the Constitution 
to discern that sovereignty actually had been overcome. See id. at 470-77 (Jay, C.J.). 
52. Proposals for overturning Chisholm were adopted within two days. See Nowak, 
The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments 
and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 
1436-40 (1975). On January 2, 1794, almost a year later, the present version was 
introduced. /d. It passed both Houses in spring of 1794 by an overwhelming majority. !d. 
The states, surprisingly, were slow to act. The Amendment was not formally announced 
as law until 1798. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE 
FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-1801, at 196 (1997). By that time, two states had still not acted 
on, and two others had flat-out rejected the Amendment. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra 
note 33, at 340-41. For a detailed look at the history of the adoption of the Eleventh 
Amendment, see John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign 
Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1926-934 (1983). 
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that the Court had jurisdiction over a common law suit against a state 
brought by a citizen of another state, the Eleventh Amendment 
established: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, 
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. "53 The Eleventh 
Amendment not only neatly displaced Chisholm,54 but also prevented 
Congress from returning to it. 55 
Over the next hundred years, the issue of state sovereign 
immunity trickled along. In 1890, in Hans v. Louisiana,56 the Supreme 
Court considered the reach of the Eleventh Amendment in a case 
brought by a citizen of the same state he was suing.57 The Court 
admitted that the Eleventh Amendment facially applies only to suits 
brought by citizens of a different state.58 Not a problem, explained 
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
54. While there can be little doubt that the Eleventh Amendment was a direct 
response to the Supreme Court's decision, the response does not mean that the Chisholm 
majority misinterpreted the Constitution. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 33, at 1060-63; 
Gibbons, supra note 52, at 1894. Nor does it mean that Justice Iredell got it right. I note 
only that the Eleventh Amendment actually did "draft with a broader brush," Alden v. 
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 724 (1999), because it prohibited suits against states brought by 
citizens of foreign states, an issue not at all raised by Chisholm. Had the drafters merely 
intended to eliminate Chisholm, they would not have included the excess language in the 
Eleventh Amendment. And if they nevertheless included excess language precluding suits 
between foreign citizens and states, why did they not consider including other language 
precluding suits between states and their own citizens? Surely it would have been easiest 
to write "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any 
suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted by any citizen against one of the United 
States." Indeed, the day after Chisholm was announced, a resolution was introduced in 
the House of Representatives which stated that "no State shall be liable to be made a 
party defendant in any of the Judicial Courts established or to be established under the 
authority of the United States, at the suit of any person or persons, citizens or foreigners, 
or of any body politic or corporate whether within or without the United States." 1 
CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 101 (1937). 
This proposal was abandoned in favor of the present version. 
55. After all, because Chisholm was at bottom a question of statutory construction, 
Congress could have overturned the decision simply by amending the Judiciary Act of 
1789. Instead, the decision was negated more pointedly by a constitutional amendment. 
56. 134 u.s. 1 (1890). 
57. !d. at 9 ("The question is presented, whether a State can be sued in a Circuit 
Court of the United States by one of its own citizens upon a suggestion that the case is one 
that arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States."). 
58. !d. at 10 ("In the present case the plaintiff in error contends that he, being a 
citizen of Louisiana, is not embarrassed by the obstacle of the Eleventh Amendment, 
inasmuch as that amendment only prohibits suits against a State which are brought by 
citizens of another State .... It is true, the amendment does so read [to permit the suit] 
and if there were no other reason or ground for abating his suit, it might be 
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the Court, because the Eleventh Amendment text is not the sole 
consideration.59 Citing Justice Iredell's dissent, the "startling and 
unexpected . . . shock" of Chisholm,60 the comments of Hamilton, 
Madison, and Marshall,61 the pre-Constitution tradition of sovereign 
immunity, and the "anomaly" of prohibiting suit by an out-of-state 
maintainable."). 
59. See id. at 10-15. 
60. !d. at 11. The Justices have quibbled over whether the decision in Chisholm 
actually created such surprise. Compare Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 720-21 (1999) 
(citing authorities), with Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 82 n.7 (1996) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (intimating that "the reaction to Chisholm reflected the popular 
hostility to the Federal Judiciary more than any desire to restrain the National 
Legislature"), and id. at 107 n.5 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that "there is ample 
evidence contradicting the 'shock of surprise' thesis"). The question is one which may 
never be resolved conclusively. Clearly, the decision met with. some hostility. Georgia 
immediately passed a bill which decreed that any individual attempting to enforce a 
judgment against the State would be "guilty of a felony and shall suffer death, without the 
benefit of clergy, by being hanged." JACOBS, supra note 35, at 56-57. The Massachusetts 
and Virginia legislatures called for a constitutional amendment. See Resolves of Mass. 28 
(1793) (No. 45); Acts of Virginia 52 (1793). But ex post hostility does not necessarily 
translate to surprise. Additionally, negative reactions were not universal; the Federalists 
applauded the decision. See Gibbons, supra note 52, at 1926; Nowak, supra note 52, at 
1433-36. The current majority continues to believe the theory. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. 
S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002). 
61. See supra note 34. There is strong evidence that the statements of Hamilton, 
Marshall, and Madison, when put into context, do not meet the unambiguous status to 
which they have been elevated. See Mark Strasser, Chisholm, the Eleventh Amendment, 
and Sovereign Immunity: On Alden's Return to Confederation Principles, 28 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 605, 634-45 (2001) (arguing that these luminaries would not have agreed with the 
current Court's take on sovereign immunity); Gibbons, supra note 52, at 1905-14 
(explaining the context of these statements). For example, Hamilton and Madison were 
writing rejoinders to the anti-Federalist propaganda. Their primary goal was to persuade 
and assuage (specifically. on the bitter New York battlefront) with their own Federalist 
rhetoric, not necessarily to state their (or anyone else's) understanding. See, e.g., Randall, 
supra note 22, at 14 ("Against the weight of evidence, Madison's, Hamilton's, and 
Marshall's statements must be understood as part of the polemics of the ratification 
process rather than as the prevailing interpretation of the founding generation."); Paul E. 
McGreal, Saving Article I from Seminole Tribe: A View from The Federalist Papers, 55 
SMU L. REV. 393, 401 n.50 (2002) (citing authorities); Gibbons, supra note 52, at 1906, 
1912 n.ll2; see also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 270 n.20 (1985) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Their fervent desire for ratification could have Jed them to 
downplay the features of the new document that were arousing controversy."). Likewise, 
if there were any doubt as to John Marshall's views on state sovereign immunity, even 
after the Eleventh Amendment, they are clarified in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 
Wheat.) 264 (1821). See Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 382 ("[The judicial department] is 
authorized to decide all cases of every description, arising under the constitution or Jaws of 
the United States. From this general grant of jurisdiction, no exception is made of those 
cases in which a State may be a party."); id. at 412 ("[I]n its origin, the judicial power was 
extended to all cases arising under the constitution or Jaws of the United States, without 
respect to parties."). 
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citizen while permitting it to an in-state citizen,62 the Court held that a 
state is immune from its own citizens' suits, notwithstanding the 
textual limitations of the Eleventh Amendment.63 As the current 
Court minority has pointed out, Hans queried only whether state 
sovereign immunity controlled absent congressional intent to the 
contrary.64 
Almost ninety years later,65 the Court confronted the question 
not fully presented in Hans: can Congress affirmatively abrogate 
state sovereign immunity? In 1976, the Court decided Fitzpatrick v. 
Bitzer,66 a case involving Congress' attempt to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity through Fourteenth Amendment legislation.67 
62. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890) 
([W]e should have this anomalous result, that in cases ansmg under the 
Constitution or laws of the United States, a State may be sued in the federal 
courts by its own citizens, though it cannot be sued for a like cause of action by 
the citizens of other States, or of a foreign state; and may be thus sued in the 
federal courts, although not allowing itself to be sued in its own courts.). 
63. See id. at 21. See Gibbons, supra note 52, at 1998-2002, for an insightf\11 political 
explanation of the result in Hans. 
64. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 84-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Hans instead 
reflects, at the most, this Court's conclusion that, as a matter of federal common law, 
federal courts should decline to entertain suits against unconsenting States. . . . Justice 
Bradley explained that the State's immunity from suit by one of its own citizens was based 
not on a constitutional rule but rather on the fact that Congress had not, by legislation, 
attempted to overcome the common-law presumption of sovereign immunity."); id. at 116-
17 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The parties in Hans raised, and the Court in that case 
answered, only what I have called the second question, that is, whether the Constitution, 
without more, permits a State to plead sovereign immunity to bar the exercise of federal-
question jurisdiction . . . . [T]he Hans Court had no occasion to consider whether 
Congress could abrogate that background immunity by statute."). Justice Stevens reads 
Hans to rely principally upon congressional statute-Qr, rather, the lack of one-rather 
than constitutional interpretation. !d. at 84-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He is, perhaps, 
alone among the Justices in that belief. !d. at 119 n.15 (Souter, J., dissenting) (recognizing 
support for Justice Stevens' view but declining to join it). 
65. One case I omit in this review of the development of state sovereign immunity 
jurisprudence is Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934), which held 
federal courts without jurisdiction over a state-law suit by a foreign sovereign against a 
state. Monaco, 292 U.S. at 317. Although there is much language in Monaco to support 
state sovereign immunity, I do not view Monaco as adding much substance to the debate. 
Monaco closely follows Hans, adopts its logic, quotes the same founding era statements, 
and harps upon the same "shock of surprise" theory of Chisholm. See id. at 320-30. 
66. 427 u.s. 445 (1976). 
67. See id. at 447-48. 
(In the 1972 Amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress, 
acting under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, authorized federal courts to 
award money damages in favor of a private individual against a state government 
found to have subjected that person to employment discrimination [outlawed by 
the statute]. The principal question presented by these cases is whether, as 
against the shield of sovereign immunity afforded the State by the Eleventh 
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The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment does provide 
Congress the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity and to 
subject the states to private suit.68 
The Court relied pointedly upon the Fourteenth Amendment, 
noting that the Civil War Amendment "clearly contemplates 
limitations on [the states'] authority,"69 and effectively created a new 
"shift in the federal-state balance" of power.70 This "expansion of 
Congress' powers-with the corresponding diminution of state 
sovereignty-" infuses Congress with an abrogation authority 
"previously reserved to the States. "71 Thus, the Court held that the 
Eleventh Amendment and state sovereign immunity are limited by 
the enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.72 
Fitzpatrick determined that state sovereign immunity could be 
trumped by Congress acting pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. 
What other parts of the Constitution authorized such a power? In 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,73 a plurality of the Court reasoned 
that the Interstate Commerce Clause74 also permitted Congress to 
eliminate state sovereign immunity because the states surrendered 
sovereignty with respect to interstate commerce when they ceded to 
Congress plenary power to regulate ies 
Although admitting that its conclusion was novel, the plurality 
began by following several prior cases marking a "trail" leading to its 
conclusion, including Fitzpatrick.76 The plurality reasoned that, 
"[l]ike the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause with one 
hand gives power to Congress while, with the other, it takes power 
away from the states."77 Importantly, for the plurality, it was the 
Amendment . . . Congress has the power to authorize federal courts to enter 
such an award against the State as a means of enforcing the substantive 
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.). 
68. !d. at 456. 
69. !d. at 453. 
70. !d. at 455. 
71. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976). 
72. !d. at 456. 
73. 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power "to regulate 
Commerce ... among the several States"). 
75. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,16-17 (1989). 
76. See id. at 14 ("Though we have never squarely resolved this issue of congressional 
power, our decisions mark a trail unmistakably leading to the conclusion that Congress 
may permit suits against the States for money damages."). 
77. !d. at 16; accord id. at 17. 
(The important point, rather, is that the provision both expands federal power 
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simultaneous cessation of regulatory power from the states and 
corresponding grant to the federal government that implicated a 
surrender of abrogation authority to the national government.78 
Accordingly, the plurality had little difficulty finding that the states 
surrendered their sovereign immunity to Congress' power under the 
Commerce Clause.79 Justice White, whose concurrence provided the 
fifth vote, added cryptically that while he concurred in the result, he 
did "not agree with much of [the plurality's] reasoning."80 
Seven years and several changes in the Court's membership later, 
the Court overruled Union Gas in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
Florida. 81 There, the Seminole Indian Tribe sued the State of Florida 
under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, a statute enacted pursuant 
to the Indian Commerce Clause82 which authorized an Indian tribe to 
bring a cause of action against a state for breach of the state's duty to 
negotiate with Indian tribes in good faith. 83 
The Court began by citing the Eleventh Amendment and stating 
that the Amendment has long stood for a meaning beyond its literal 
text.84 That meaning, explained the Court, was that unconsenting 
states, by virtue of their sovereignty, are not amenable to suit by 
private individuals.85 This position was not remarkable. A host of 
prior Court decisions had recognized substantive meaning beyond the 
and contracts state power; that is the meaning, in fact, of a 'plenary' grant of 
authority, and the lower courts have rightly concluded that it makes no sense to 
conceive of§ 5 as somehow being an 'ultraplenary' grant of authority.). 
78. See id. at 19-20. 
(Because the Commerce Clause withholds power from the States at the same 
time as it confers it on Congress, and because the congressional power thus 
conferred would be incomplete without the authority to render States liable in 
damages, it must be that, to the extent that the States gave Congress the 
authority to regulate commerce, they also relinquished their immunity where 
Congress found it necessary, in exercising this authority, to render them liable.). 
79. See id. at 20. 
80. /d. at 57 {White, J., concurring & dissenting). 
81. 517 u.s. 44 (1996). 
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power "to regulate 
Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes"). 
83. 25 u.s.c. § 2710{d) {1996). 
84. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 ("Although the text of the Amendment would 
appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, 'we have 
understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the 
presupposition ... which it confirms."') (quoting Blatchford v. Native Viii. of Noatak, 501 
U.S. 775, 779 (1991) {ellipsis in Seminole Tribe)). 
85. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 ("[F]ederal jurisdiction over suits against 
unconsenting States 'was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the 
judicial power of the United States."') (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 {1890)). 
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Eleventh Amendment's text.86 Seminole Tribe merely reiterated that 
86. See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Viii. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) ("[W]e 
have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for 
the presupposition ... which it confirms."); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 
234, 238 (1985) ("As we have recognized, the significance of this Amendment 'lies in its 
affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of 
judicial authority in Art. III' of the Constitution.") (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. 
v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984)); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974) 
("While the Amendment by its terms does not bar suits against a State by its own citizens, 
this Court has consistently held that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought 
in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State."); Employees 
of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare of Mo. v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare of Mo., 
411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973) ("Although the Eleventh Amendment is not literally applicable 
since petitioners who brought suit, are citizens of Missouri, it is established that an 
unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as 
well as by citizens of another State."); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 
322 (1934) ("Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of the words of§ 2 
of Article III, or assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the 
restrictions upon suits against non-consenting States. Behind the words of the 
constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control."); In re N.Y., 256 U.S. 
490, 497 (1921) ("[I]t has become established by repeated decisions of this court that the 
entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain 
a suit brought by private parties against a State without consent given: not one brought by 
citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State, because of the 
Eleventh Amendment; and not even one brought by its own citizens, because of the 
fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification."); In re Ayers, 123 
U.S. 443, 505-06 (1887) ("To secure the manifest purposes of the constitutional exemption 
guarantied by the [eleventh] amendment requires that it should be interpreted, not 
literally and too narrowly, but fairly, and with such breadth and largeness as effectually to 
accomplish the substance of its purpose."). 
The Court has continued to cling steadfastly to a breadth of the Eleventh Amendment 
distended from its text. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753 
(2002) ("As a result, the Eleventh Amendment does not define the scope of the States' 
sovereign immunity; it is but one particular exemplification of that immunity."); Bd. of 
Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) ("Although by its terms the 
Amendment applies only to suits against a State by citizens of another State, our cases 
have extended the Amendment's applicability to suits by citizens against their own 
States."); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) ("[W]e have made clear that 
the Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting 
States."); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 736 (1999) ("[T]he ... text of the Amendment is 
not an exhaustive description of the States' constitutional immunity from suit."); Coli. Sav. 
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 669 (1999) 
("Though its precise terms bar only federal jurisdiction over suits brought against one 
State by citizens of another State or foreign state, we have long recognized that the 
Eleventh Amendment accomplished must more: It repudiated the central premise ... that 
the jurisdictional heads of Article III superseded the sovereign immunity that the States 
possessed before entering the Union."); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd. v. Coli. Sav. 
Bank, 527 U.S. 627,634-35 (1999) (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54); Idaho v. Coeur 
d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997) ("The Court's recognition of sovereign 
immunity has not been limited to the suits described in the text of the Eleventh 
Amendment."). 
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extra-textual proposition87 and established that, at least in the absence 
of congressional abrogation, Florida was immune from the suit.88 
The Court then turned to whether Congress had validly 
abrogated that immunity.89 Of course, Union Gas, which held that 
Congress could abrogate pursuant to the Interstate Commerce 
Clause, almost squarely answered that question, especially on Justice 
Brennan's broad reasoning. But the Seminole Tribe Court 
reconsidered Union Gas. Holding that Union Gas's reasoning was 
fully supported by only a minority of Justices,90 "deviated sharply 
from our established federalism jurisprudence and essentially 
eviscerated our decision in Hans," 91 and relied on cases which were 
off-point,92 the Court overruled it. The Court concluded: 
In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that the 
background principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in 
the Eleventh Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate 
when the subject of the suit is an area, like the regulation of 
Indian commerce, that is under the exclusive control of the 
Federal Government.93 
Three years later, in Alden v. Maine,94 the Court considered 
whether Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity in state 
court. Here, the majority Justices confronted a perplexing twist on 
the Eleventh Amendment. If, as Seminole Tribe recited, the Eleventh 
Amendment stood as the nontextual font of the elusive principle of 
state sovereign immunity, the majority was in a bind when it came to 
state courts because the Eleventh Amendment clearly speaks only to 
a limitation of federal court jurisdiction.95 
87. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 n.7 (1996) (citing cases). 
88. /d. at 55-56. 
89. Id at 58. 
90. /d. at 63-64, 66. 
91. /d. at 64. 
92. /d. at 65-66 (criticizing the Union Gas plurality for relying on waiver cases and 
Fitzpatrick). 
93. Id. at 72. 
94. 527 u.s. 706 (1999). 
95. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of 
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State.") (emphasis added); see also Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 204-05 
(1991) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not apply in state courts.") (quoting Will v. 
Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1989)). All nine Justices in Alden 
recognized this obvious quandary. Alden, 527 U.S. at 730; id. at 760 (Souter, J., dissenting) 
("[T]he Court of course confronts the fact that the state forum renders the Eleventh 
Amendment beside the point .... "). 
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To reach the decision that Congress lacked authority to abrogate 
state sovereign immunity in state courts, the Supreme Court promptly 
distanced state sovereign immunity from the Eleventh Amendment.96 
Rather than confining the principle to that provision, Alden found 
state sovereign immunity incorporated between the Constitution's 
lines of text as part of the essence of federalism.97 
Such a holding required that the state sovereign immunity 
principle was a part of the original Constitution, misinterpreted by 
Chisholm and restored by the Eleventh Amendment. The Court first 
viewed pre-ratification historical evidence indicating that the States 
universally recognized sovereign immunity98 and comments by the 
Framers advocating the retention of state sovereign immunity in 
general.99 Turning to post-ratification evidence, the Court cited the 
Eleventh Amendment's overruling of Chisholm as evidence that the 
fledgling nation considered state sovereign immunity to be left 
relatively undisturbed by the Constitution's text.100 
Concluding that the historical evidence amply supported its 
conclusion that the original meaning of the Constitution did not 
extend judicial power to suits against states, the Court next examined 
its prior decisions. Citing the plethora of cases discerning immunity 
outside the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court 
interpreted the amalgam to stand for the idea that state sovereign 
immunity was captured in the whole of the Constitution, not merely 
the Eleventh Amendment.101 State sovereign immunity "inheres," 
96. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 ("We have, as a result, sometimes referred to the States' 
immunity from suit as 'Eleventh Amendment immunity.' The phrase is convenient 
shorthand but something of a misnomer, for the sovereign immunity of the States neither 
derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment."); cf id. at 761 
(Souter, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, if the Court's current reasoning is correct, the Eleventh 
Amendment itself was unnecessary."); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 95 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) ("The fundamental error that continues to lead the Court astray is its failure to 
acknowledge that its modern embodiment of the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity 
has absolutely nothing to do with the limit on judicial power contained in the Eleventh 
Amendment.") (internal quotation marks omitted). 
97. Alden, 527 U.S. at 730 ("This separate and distinct structural principle is not 
directly related to the scope of the judicial power established by Article III, but inheres in 
the system of federalism established by the Constitution."). 
98. /d. at 715-16 ("Although the American people had rejected other aspects of 
English political theory, the doctrine that a sovereign could not be sued without its 
consent was universal in the States when the Constitution was drafted and ratified."). 
99. /d. at 716-19 (reviewing the writings of Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall). 
100. /d. at 720-27 (suggesting that the Eleventh Amendment meant to restore, rather 
than alter, the original meaning of the Constitution). 
101. /d. at 728 ("These holdings reflect a settled doctrinal understanding, consistent 
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according to the Court, in the "structure" of the Constitution, and the 
mere fact that the Eleventh Amendment only speaks to federal court 
jurisdiction does not mean that the states have any less immunity in 
state courts.102 To the contrary, Alden found no state surrender of 
sovereign immunity in the "plan of the Convention" with respect to 
federal claims in state courts.103 
The Court buttressed its historical findings with principles of 
normative concerns: the respect for the dignity of states as 
sovereigns,'04 the alignment of state sovereignty with federal 
sovereignty in some semblance of symmetrical sovereignty,105 the 
fiscal concern of burdening state treasuries with a few private, but 
massive, judgments,106 the republican concern of disrupting local 
governance,107 the hesitancy to create anomalies, such as state 
immunity in federal court but not in their own courts,108 and the 
with the views of the leading advocates of the Constitution's ratification, that sovereign 
immunity derives not from the Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the 
original Constitution itself."). 
102. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730-31 (1999); accord id. at 733-34 ("[T]he structure 
and history of the Constitution make clear that the immunity exists today by constitutional 
design."). The Court distinguished Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), which held that 
states can be privately sued in other states' courts, as not speaking to the issue of whether 
states could be hailed into their own courts. Hall, 440 U.S. at 738-40. A sovereign's 
amenability to suit in another's courts, Alden expounded, is a matter of comity, while a 
sovereign's amenability to suit in its own courts is solely within the province of the 
sovereign. Alden, 527 U.S. at 749; accord Hall, 440 U.S. at 416 ("[A] claim of immunity in 
another sovereign's courts ... necessarily implicates the power and authority of a second 
sovereign; its source must be found either in an agreement, express or implied, between 
the two sovereigns, or in the voluntary decision of the second to respect the dignity of the 
first as a matter of comity."). 
103. Alden, 527 U.S. at 760. The investigation turned up silence, which, the Court 
inferred, meant that the states had no intention of surrendering their immunity in their 
own courts. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 741 ("[T]he silence is most instructive. It suggests the 
sovereign's right to assert immunity from suit in its own courts was a principle so well 
established that no one conceived it would be altered by the new Constitution."). Silence 
also is consistent with at least two other logical possibilities: that everyone plainly 
understood the states to surrender immunity or that no one really considered the issue. 
Nevertheless, by making silence dispositive, the opponents of abrogation have dealt it a 
heavy blow. 
104. /d. at 749-50. 
105. /d. 
(It is unquestioned that the Federal Government retains its own immunity from 
suit not only in state tribunals but also in its own courts. In light of our 
constitutional system recognizing the essential sovereignty of the States, we are 
reluctant to conclude that the States are not entitled to a reciprocal privilege.). 
106. /d. at 750. 
107. /d. at 751. 
108. Alden, 527 U.S. at 752-53. 
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practical reality that other means of assuring state compliance exist.109 
As these cases demonstrate, the Court has not been hesitant to 
answer new state sovereign immunity questions in the last few years, 
and the correctness of its answers has been the subject of heated 
debate among commentators and the Court itself. The debate is 
saturated on both sides, and I need not enter the fray here. Instead, I 
seek the rule of law. Accepting that state sovereign immunity is a 
constitutional right which was only surrendered by the states pursuant 
to the plan of the convention (as the Court has), where does their 
sovereign immunity end and the government's power to abrogate 
begin? With this backdrop, I turn now to the task of discerning the 
boundaries of the current state sovereign immunity doctrine. 
III. The Boundaries of State Sovereign Immunity 
So where does state sovereign immunity yield to the federal 
government's power to abrogate? I believe that the Court 
understands state sovereign immunity to trump all federal powers 
granted by the original Constitution. Though obscure on this point, 
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida 110 is best read to stand for the 
proposition that Congress has no power under Article I to abrogate 
state sovereign immunity. Seminole Tribe and other sovereign 
immunity cases also strongly suggest that the federal government has 
no power under any other provision in the original Constitution to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity. However, the Fourteenth 
Amendment clearly does provide Congress a limited abrogation 
power. Amendments enacted subsequent to the Fourteenth 
Amendment are built upon the federal-state shift the Civil War 
Amendments created and, therefore, may also provide abrogation 
power. Additionally, because the Fourteenth Amendment 
retroactively incorporated most of the rights protected by the Bill of 
Rights, it is best understood as permitting abrogation under certain 
Amendments predating the Eleventh Amendment. In other words, 
state immunity is inviolable with respect to the original Constitution 
but may be susceptible to abrogation under its Amendments. State 
sovereign immunity, therefore, is not a clause-driven, but rather an 
amendment-driven, inquiry. 111 
109. See id. at 755. 
llO. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
111. As support for the contrary view, Professor Bandes states: "The notion of a 
generally applicable sovereign immunity doctrine is at odds with the current doctrinal 
understanding, which is highly clause-bound." Bandes, supra note 23, at 745. For this 
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A. Article I 
Seminole Tribe, perhaps the preeminent decision defining the 
contours of state sovereign immunity, strongly supports the view that 
state sovereign immunity trumps all Article I powers.112 The case 
involved a suit against the State of Florida brought under Indian 
Commerce Clause legislation. The Court noted that the only other 
time it had recognized Congress' power to abrogate pursuant to an 
Article I power was Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 113 which found 
abrogation power in the Interstate Commerce Clause. Seminole 
Tribe characterized Union Gas as follows: "We think it clear that 
Justice Brennan's opinion finds Congress' power to abrogate under 
the Interstate Commerce Clause from the states' cession of their 
sovereignty when they gave Congress plenary power to regulate 
interstate commerce."114 According to Seminole Tribe, Union Gas 
reasoned that the surrender of plenary regulatory authority to 
Congress also necessitated the surrender of abrogation authority to 
Congress.115 Because Congress has at least the same plenary power (if 
not more) to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, Union· Gas, if 
propositiOn, she cites a recent article authored by Professor Vicki Jackson, Holistic 
Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and our Bifurcated Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1259 
(2001). Under my reading, Professor Jackson actually argues quite the opposite: "In its 
recent decisions, the Court's analysis of the constitutional scope of federal powers has 
been particularly 'clause-bound,' while its analysis of state immunities has focused on a 
more holistic appreciation of the structure and relationship of different parts of the 
Constitution to each other." Jackson, supra note 23, at 1260-61. Professor Bandes also 
suggests that the Ex parte Young doctrine has been applied "in an increasingly clause-
bound manner." Bandes, supra note 23, at 751. However, this "clause-bound manner" 
has developed only between Article I powers and the Fourteenth Amendment, the same 
parameters of state sovereign immunity in general. See id. at 751 n.46 (comparing Indian 
Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment cases). 
112. In my own view, Seminole Tribe at best is an extremely weak opinion and at 
worst, a deeply flawed one. Based solely on the opinion itself, I would consider anything 
other than its narrowest holding to be an open question. Nevertheless, when read in light 
of Union Gas and subsequent cases, I believe its broader intent is clear. 
113. 491 u.s. 1 (1989). 
114. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 61. 
115. See id. at 62 ("Indeed, it was in those circumstances where Congress exercised 
complete authority that Justice Brennan thought the power to abrogate most necessary."). 
This is a fair characterization of the plurality's reasoning. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19-
20 ("Because the Commerce Clause withholds power from the States at the same time as 
it confers it on Congress, and because the congressional power thus conferred would be 
incomplete without the authority to render States liable in damages, it must be that, to the 
extent that the States gave Congress the authority to regulate commerce, they also 
relinquished their immunity where Congress found it necessary, in exercising this 
authority, to render them liable."). 
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correctly decided, directed that Florida lose. 116 
The Court, however, overruled Union Gas. 117 The Court went 
out of its way to expressly state its rejection of the reasoning of Union 
Gas, as well as its holding. 118 In other words, the states' cession of 
"complete law-making authority over a particular area" does not 
necessarily require their cession of abrogation authority as well. 119 
The Court concluded: "In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm 
that the background principle of state sovereign immunity embodied 
in the Eleventh Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate when 
the subject of the suit is an area, like the regulation of Indian 
commerce, that is under the exclusive control of the Federal 
Government. "120 
Importantly, Seminole Tribe makes sense only if it actually holds 
that Congress has no power under Article I to subject the states to 
private suit. Seminole Tribe repudiated Union Gas's reasoning that 
abrogation power follows plenary regulatory power, and, having done 
so, the Court need not have overruled the Union Gas holding.121 
Deprived of its reasoning, Union Gas no longer directed the result in 
Seminole Tribe. The Court could have just as easily left the Interstate 
Commerce Clause power open for another day and focused instead 
on a clause-specific analysis of whether Hamilton's plan of the 
convention contemplated congressional abrogation of state sovereign 
immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause. 
The Court did not engage in such a clause-specific inquiry, 
116. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 62-63 (1996). 
117. See supra text accompanying notes 89-93. 
118. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66-67 (focusing specifically on the Union Gas 
reasoning). 
119. !d. at 72. 
120. !d. 
121. See id. at 66-67. Indeed, a strong case can be made that Seminole Tribe was 
merely setting up the Union Gas plurality's reasoning as a straw man. Under Marks v. 
United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no 
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the 
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds." Marks, 430 U.S. at 193. Because Justice White 
agreed with the result in Union Gas but not the expansive reasoning of the plurality, his 
concurrence is the narrowest rationale. Under Marks, Seminole Tribe should have read 
Union Gas for its narrowest holding, Justice White's, and disregarded the plurality's 
rationale for the result. That narrow holding was simply that Congress could abrogate 
state sovereign immunity under the Commerce Clause. Thus, because Seminole Tribe did 
not involve the Commerce Clause (and, indeed, specifically recognized the differences 
between the Commerce Clause and the Indian Commerce Clause), it was not bound by, 
and need not have reconsidered, Union Gas. 
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however. Rather, the Court overruled Union Gas and engaged in 
very little clause-specific analysis of the Indian Commerce Clause, 
except to affirm that the states' cession of plenary regulatory 
authority is irrelevant. The only way to achieve this result was for the 
Court to rely on a similarly broad rule applying to both the Indian 
Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause. 
This is exactly what Seminole Tribe did, by implicitly extending 
state sovereign immunity at least to the reaches of Article I. I say 
"implicitly" because the Court's precise reasoning (if not its intent) is 
difficult to fathom; however, three reasons convince me that Seminole 
Tribe did establish this rule. First, the opinion reads extremely 
broadly and its scope appears to encompass all of Article I: "The 
Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, 
and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional 
limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction."122 Second, such a rule 
was necessary to justify both overruling Union Gas's holding and 
dictating the result in Seminole Tribe, especially without any in-depth 
discussion of the two Clauses at issue. Finally, both the dissent and a 
host of subsequent decisions have recognized Seminole Tribe as 
standing for the proposition that Article I cannot be used to abrogate 
state sovereign immunity.123 For these reasons Seminole Tribe and its 
122. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,72-73 (1996). 
123. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 749-50 (2002) 
(stating that in Seminole Tribe "we held that Congress, pursuant to its Article I powers, 
cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity"); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 
531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001) ("Congress may not, of course, base its abrogation of the States' 
Eleventh Amendment immunity upon the powers enumerated in Article I."); Kimel v. Fla. 
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80 (2000) ("In Seminole Tribe, we held that Congress lacks 
power under Article I to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity."); Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706, 712 (1999) ("[Seminole Tribe] made it clear that Congress lacks power under 
Article I to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from suits commenced or prosecuted 
in the federal courts."); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coli. Sav. Bank, 
527 U.S. 627, 636 (1999) ("Seminole Tribe makes clear that Congress may not abrogate 
state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers; hence the Patent Remedy Act 
cannot be sustained under either the Commerce Clause or the Patent Clause."); see also 
Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 2001); Reickenbacker v. Foster, 
No. 00-31121 (5th Cir. Dec. 3, 2001) (citing Seminole Tribe for the proposition that "[I]t is 
now settled that Congress may not act to abrogate state sovereign immunity through any 
of its Article I enumerated powers"); Yselta del Sur Pueblo v. Laney, 199 F.3d 281, 288 
(5th Cir. 2000); In re Sacred Heart Hasp. of Norristown, 133 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 1998) 
("The Seminole Tribe Court held that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign 
immunity by legislation passed pursuant to its Article I powers."); Velasquez v. Frapwell, 
160 F.3d 389, 394 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J.), vacated on other grounds, 165 F.3d 593 
(7th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); Close v. New York, 125 F.3d 31, 38 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(citing cases); cf Pennyslvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 40 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) ("If private suits against States, though not permitted under Article III (by 
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progeny provide strong evidence that Article I abrogation questions 
are not deemed to be clause-bound under current state sovereign 
immunity jurisprudence. 
Recently, a Sixth Circuit panel in In re Hood124 held, in conflict 
with five other Courts of Appeals,125 that the Bankruptcy Clause of 
Article I provides Congress with the power to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity. 126 The text of the Bankruptcy Clause provides 
that Congress may "establish ... uniform Laws on the subject of 
Bankruptcies throughout the United States."127 Hood suggested that 
the term "uniform" necessarily contemplates a surrender of state 
sovereign immunity pursuant to the plan of the convention. Hood 
reasoned that the states necessarily ceded regulatory power under the 
Bankruptcy Clause because "[g)ranting the federal government the 
power to make uniform laws is, at least to some extent, inconsistent 
with states retaining the power to make laws over that issue."'28 
Regardless of the import of the term 'uniform,' it cannot, under 
Seminole Tribe and its progeny, necessarily equate to the surrender of 
state sovereign immunity. The term cannot mean that all parties to a 
bankruptcy proceeding must be treated equally. Rather, the term 
most plausibly applies only to conflicting codes and procedures. In 
other words, the importance is structural uniformity, rather than 
party equality. In such a case, a state's assertion of immunity does 
nothing to destroy "uniformity," since the bankruptcy laws, including 
the exception for state sovereign immunity, would be the same in 
virtue of the understanding represented by the Eleventh Amendment), are nonetheless 
permitted under the Commerce Clause, or under some other Article I grant of federal 
power, then there is no reason why the other limitations of Article III cannot be similarly 
exceeded. That Article would be transformed from a comprehensive description of the 
permissible scope of federal judicial authority to a mere default disposition, applicable 
unless and until Congress prescribes more expansive authority in the exercise of one of its 
Article I powers. That is not the regime the Constitution establishes."). But see Diaz-
Gandia v. Dapena-Thompson, 90 F.3d 609, 616 n.9 (1st Cir. 1996) (proclaiming, without 
explanation, that Seminole Tribe "does not control the War Powers analysis"). 
124. 319 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. Feb. 3,.2003). 
125. See In re Nelson, 301 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Mitchell, 209 F.3d 1111 (9th 
Cir. 2000); In re Fernandez, 123 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1997), amended by In re Fernandez, 130 
F.3d 1138 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Creative Goldsmiths of Wash., D.C., 119 F.3d 1140 (4th 
Cir. 1997). 
126. See Hood, 319 F.3d at 758 ("[W]e conclude that Article I, section 8 of the 
Constitution gives Congress the power to abrogate states' sovereign immunity."). 
127. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 4. 
128. Hood, 319 F.3d at 763; accord id. at 764 ("In order for laws to be uniform, the 
laws must be the same everywhere. That uniformity would be unattainable if states could 
pass their own laws."). 
Summer 2002] METES AND BOUNDS 747 
every case. 
At most, the term means that the power to pass bankruptcy laws 
resides exclusively in the federal government.129 Hood adopts this 
interpretation130 and relies on The Federalist No. 32 as support for the 
conclusion that where federal power is exclusive, the states waived 
their sovereign immunity.13' But Seminole Tribe pointedly disavowed 
that exclusive regulatory power does not necessarily include an 
abrogation power. 132 Justice Stevens warned that the reasoning of 
Seminole Tribe would apply equally to the Patent Clause and the 
Bankruptcy Clause.133 The majority was nonplussed.134 Justice Souter, 
129. The Court has, however, early on eschewed this interpretation. See Sturges v. 
Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122,193-96 (1819) (holding that the Bankruptcy Clause 
prohibited state regulation only where Congress had already acted). 
130. See Hood, 319 F.3d at 764 ("As it was initially understood, the Bankruptcy Clause 
represented the states' total grant of their power to legislate on bankruptcy."). 
131. See id. at 765 ("The Federalist suggests that the states shed their immunity from 
suit along with their power to legislate together when the states agreed to the Bankruptcy 
Clause's uniformity provision."). Hood recognizes that the power to legislate may be 
divorced from the power to abrogate. See id. at 765 ("Of course, it is possible that in 
ceding some sovereignty with the Bankruptcy Clause, the states ceded their legislative 
powers but not their immunity from suit . . . . This could suggest that the power to 
legislate and the immunity from suit were distinct aspects of sovereignty in the early 
Americans' minds, and that the decision to cede one aspect to the federal government 
does not by itself imply a surrender of the other."). 
132. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 62-63, 72-73 (1996). 
(Under the rationale of Union Gas, if the States' partial cession of authority over 
a particular area includes cession of the immunity from suit, then their virtually 
total cession of authority over a different area must also include cession of the 
immunity from suit. . . . We agree with petitioner that the plurality opinion in 
Union Gas allows no principled distinction in favor of the States to be drawn 
between the Indian Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause .... 
In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that the background principle of 
state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not so 
ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is an area, like the 
regulation of Indian commerce, that is under the exclusive control of the Federal 
Government. Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-
making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents 
congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting 
States. The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, 
and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed 
upon federal jurisdiction. Petitioner's suit against the State of Florida must be 
dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction.). 
133. See id. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Rather, it prevents Congress from 
providing a federal forum for a broad range of actions against States, from those sounding 
in copyright and patent law, to those concerning bankruptcy, environmental law, and the 
regulation of our vast national economy."); id. at 93-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In 
confronting the question whether a federal grant of jurisdiction is within the scope of 
Article III, as limited by the Eleventh Amendment, I see no reason to distinguish among 
statutes enacted pursuant to the power granted to Congress to regulate commerce among 
the several States, and with the Indian tribes, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, the power to establish 
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in dissent, presented the same Federalist No. 32 argument as Hood,135 
but his words fell on deaf ears-the majority did not even deign to 
respond, choosing instead to rely on the sweeping statements of 
precedent.136 Hood is, I believe, in irreconcilable conflict with 
Seminole Tribe. 
I am more sympathetic to the argument that some Article I 
clauses, such as the War Powers Clauses, might provide abrogation 
authority because of their extreme federal slant.137 The nation's need 
to act quickly and without internal resistance in military matters is 
extremely important.138 Finally, federalism concerns are arguably 
weaker in the War Powers context.139 Thus, in the area of foreign 
uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy, Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, the power to promote the 
progress of science and the arts by granting exclusive rights to authors and inventors, Art. 
I, § 8, cl. 8, the power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, § 5, or 
indeed any other provision of the Constitution."). 
134. See id. at 72 n.16 (stating that "it has not been widely thought that the federal 
antitrust, bankruptcy, or copyright statutes abrogated the States' sovereign immunity" and 
arguing that the efficacy of these statutes do not necessitate suits against states). 
135. See id. at 143 n.39 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("As I explain further below, the views 
of Madison and his allies on this more difficult question can be divined, if at all, only by 
reference to the more extended discussions by Hamilton in The Federalist No. 32, and by 
Justice Iredell in his Chisholm dissent. Both those discussions, I submit, tend to support a 
congressional power of abrogation."); id. at 145-49 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
The Federalist No. 32 supports an abrogation power when the federal government has 
exclusive regulatory control over a particular subject). 
136. See id. at 68-71. 
137. The U.S. government has taken this stance in several War Powers cases. See 
Vazquez, supra note 23, at 726 n.66 (citing briefs of the U.S. Attorney in various cases). 
138. An America on the brink of war could little benefit from a "cacophony of 
conflicting policies," Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The 
Original Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341, 344 
(1999), insisted upon by various state positions. State resistance to national military and 
international policies could undermine the security of the nation as a whole. At the very 
least, state resistance could embarrass the national government. See Richard B. Bilder, 
The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 821, 827-28 (1989). 
Such conflict between the states and the national government was a principal impetus for 
replacing the Articles of Confederation. 
139. In addition to serious detriments of state resistance to congressional War Powers 
legislation, the primary benefits justifying federalism are weakened in the context of the 
War Powers. One commonly invoked justification for federalism is that the states provide 
independent training grounds for novel governmental matters. See Barry Friedman, 
Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 397 (1997). In the context of military and 
international affairs, any "testing" would be virtually nonexistent because war falls in the 
exclusive province of the national government. A second justification for federalism, local 
expertise, see id. at 401-02; cf United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581-83 (1995) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring), is similarly inapplicable. States usually have less expertise than 
the federal government in international matters, both because the issues may involve 
mattefSihaving very little to do with the state and because the states have traditionally 
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affairs, national uniformity is paramount, and one could argue 
persuasively that the ability of the states to resist federal coercion 
should diminish with respect to Congress' War Powers. 
Indeed, the majority in Seminole Tribe recognized that not all 
Article I clauses are alike in their federal character when it 
distinguished between the Interstate Commerce Clause and the 
Indian Commerce Clause.140 Implicitly, Seminole Tribe momentarily 
opened the door to the possibility that if an Article I clause had 
sufficient federal chutzpah, it might authorize abrogation of state 
sovereign immunity. However, Seminole Tribe did not go down that 
path. The Court refused to take a clause-specific approach, favoring 
instead wholesale line-drawing.141 
In any case, I find it most unlikely that the current Court would 
find a War Powers exception, even if the Court made the inquiry. In 
addition to the arguments I make in the following Subpart, there are 
two reasons why there is no room in the current majority's 
understanding for a War Powers exception. First, the War Powers 
Clause's preeminent federal nature does not approach the dramatic 
shift in federal-state power effectuated by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the one constitutional provision which the Court has 
identified as sufficiently federal to encompass an abrogation power. 
Second, the Court has long held that not even the War Powers 
Clause, at least in times of peace,142 can override individual rights 
secured by the Constitution.143 Given the majority's recent propensity 
for comparing the stature of state sovereign immunity to that of 
individual rights/44 the majority probably would view a War Powers 
been excluded from international and military affairs. See Hilder, supra note 138, at 828. 
140. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 61-62 (1996). 
141. See supra text accompanying notes 121-122. 
142. Of course, constitutional lines drawn for peacetime application may buckle in 
times of war. Whether war alters the interplay between state sovereign immunity and the 
government's abrogation authority, however, is well beyond the scope of this article. 
143. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 34-35 (1957) (holding that Congress could not 
contravene the right to trial by jury through exercise of its War Powers during peacetime). 
144. See, e.g., Coli. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 
U.S. 666, 682 (1999) ("State sovereign immunity, no less than the right to trial by jury in 
criminal cases, is constitutionally protected."). My own view finds the analogy of state 
sovereign immunity to individual rights highly problematic. The Tenth Amendment, for 
example, which speaks of states, speaks only of "powers," not "rights," U.S. CONST. 
amend. X, even though its precursor, Article 2 of the Articles of Confederation, stated 
that: "[E]ach state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, 
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation, expressly delegated to the 
United States .... " ART. OF CONFEDERATION art. ·II. Of the states' sovereignty, 
freedom, independence, power, jurisdiction, and right, only state "power" graduated to 
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exception with great suspicion. 
Although a creative Court with different members might use the 
War Powers Clause to reopen the door that Seminole Tribe slammed 
shut, it seems to me extremely unlikely that the current Court would 
ever do so. The majority is set on expanding state sovereign 
immunity to the reaches of Article I, without exception. Based on 
Seminole Tribe and many of the reasons I explain in the following 
Subpart, I am convinced that the Court views Article I as proving no 
abrogation authority. 
B. The Original Constitution 
While Seminole Tribe and its progeny convmce me that the 
majority believes state sovereign immunity to extend at least to the 
reaches of Article I, the opinions of those cases are meticulously 
worded not to extend Seminole Tribe's holding beyond Article I. 
Therefore, the question of whether the federal government may 
abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to some other Article's 
power, such as the Treaty Power of Article II, is more difficult. 
Nevertheless, while the Court's opinions are phrased with care, there 
are several reasons why the majority does not understand any part of 
the entire original Constitution to permit the federal government to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity. 
First, the Court has often characterized Eleventh Amendment 
state sovereign immunity as a limitation on the Article III jurisdiction 
of the federal courts.145 Article III imparts jurisdiction on three 
general bases: the source of the law, the subject-matter of the suit, or 
the parties in the case.146 The Eleventh Amendment tracks the party-
the protections of the Tenth Amendment. By contrast, the Ninth Amendment speaks of 
"rights," but directs that the "rights" are retained by the people-it grants nothing to the 
states. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. Indeed, throughout the Amendments, "rights" are given 
to the people, not states. See id. amends. I, II, IV, and VI. 
145. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73 ("The Eleventh Amendment restricts the 
judicial power under Article III, and Article l cannot be used to circumvent the 
constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction."). 
146. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, 
or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to 
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two 
or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of 
different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of 
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens 
or Subjects."). 
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based language of Article 111/47 thus indicating that the drafters of the 
Eleventh Amendment meant specifically to address that part of 
Article III. The Eleventh Amendment, however, provides no 
exceptions based on the constitutional source of the abrogation 
attempt; instead, the Amendment's prohibition extends to "any suit 
in law or equity."148 It thus implicitly incorporates the entire source-
of-law-jurisdiction found in Article Ill, which extends to "all Cases, in 
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the 
United States, and Treaties made."149 Accordingly, the Eleventh 
Amendment's restriction applies, if the other requirements are 
satisfied, whether the constitutional authorization came from Article 
I, Article II, or any other Article. Nothing in the interplay between 
the Eleventh Amendment and Article III imparts significance to the 
particular source of the law in question. Therefore, because the 
Court has held that Article I cannot alter the jurisdictional limits of 
Article III (as explained by the Eleventh Amendment and other 
aspects of state sovereign immunity),150 it would be difficult for the 
Court to justify how other parts of the original Constitution could do 
151 
so. 
Second, the Court has also proclaimed that the broader principle 
of state sovereign immunity affects much more than just Article III 
because it is a balance struck by the very federal fabric of the original 
Constitution.152 If so, there is no reason to draw lines of distinction 
147. Cf. id. with U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States 
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of 
any Foreign State."). 
148. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added). 
149. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2. 
150. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996). 
151. Cf. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 328-32 (1934) (breaking 
down the sovereign immunity analysis by Article III distinctions); Pennsylvania v. Union 
Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 39-40 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("When we have turned to 
consider whether 'a surrender of [state] immunity [is inherent] in the plan of the 
convention,' we have discussed that issue under the rubric of the various grants of 
jurisdiction in Article III, seeking to determine which of those grants must reasonably be 
thought to include suits against the States. We have never gone thumbing through the 
Constitution, to see what other original grants of authority-as opposed to Amendments 
adopted after the Eleventh Amendment-might justify elimination of state sovereign 
immunity.") (internal italics omitted). 
152. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999) ("This separate and distinct 
structural principle is not directly related to the scope of the judicial power established by 
Article III, but inheres in the system of federalism established by the Constitution."); see 
also id. at 713 ("[T]he sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited 
by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment."); Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports 
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between various parts of the original Constitution. The balance exists 
as part of the original Plan in toto and does not wax or wane 
depending upon the particular constitutional source of a law.153 The 
entire original Constitution is the framework for state sovereign 
immunity, and therefore every provision therein is bound by the 
federalism constraints it imposes. 
Third, the Framers designed the Supremacy Clause of Article 
Vt 54 as the primary mechanism to maintain the federal government's 
power over the states. The Clause makes all laws and treaties, 
irrespective of their source, supreme over state law in almost exactly 
the same way and without meaningful distinction. 155 If the Supremacy 
Clause does not permit overriding state sovereign immunity under 
the authority of Article I statutes, then, ipso facto, neither does it for 
laws made under the authority of other provisions of the 
Constitution. In effect, Seminole Tribe and its progeny can perhaps 
be more appropriately read not as Article I cases, or even as Eleventh 
Amendment cases, but rather as Supremacy Clause cases: that the 
Supremacy Clause alone does not contemplate the abrogation of state 
• • • 156 
sovereign 1mmumty. 
Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753 (2002) ("As a result, the Eleventh Amendment does not define 
the scope of the States sovereign immunity; it is but one particular exemplification of that 
immunity."); id. at 768 n.18 ("The principle of state sovereign immunity enshrined in our 
constitutional framework, however, is not rooted in the Tenth Amendment."). 
153. In contrast, the Fourteenth Amendment was specifically designed to alter the 
federal-state balance of power struck by the original Constitution. The analysis of those 
parts of the Constitution and its Amendments which were affected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, therefore, differs from the analysis of the original Constitution. See infra 
Subpart C. 
154. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... "). 
155. See id. The Founders were concerned with ineffective enforcement of federal 
laws (treaties, statutes, and the Articles themselves) against the states under the Articles 
of Confederation. They rectified this in the same way: with a Supremacy Clause directed 
at all three. See Vazquez, supra note 23, at 733; Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based 
Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1108 (1992) ("[I]n the end, 
the Framers adopted the very same mechanism for enforcing treaties, federal statutes, and 
the Constitution itself. It consisted of the Supremacy Clause and its corollary in Article 
III."). 
156. For the Court's recent discussion of this concept, see Alden, 527 U.S. at 732-33 
("When a State asserts its immunity to suit, the question is not the primacy of federal law 
but the implementation of the law in a manner consistent with the constitutional 
sovereignty of the States .... [N]either the Supremacy Clause nor the enumerated powers 
of Congress confer authority to abrogate the States' immunity from suit in federal 
court."). 
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Fourth, the Court has resurrected the once-discredited157 
rationale that state sovereign immunity protects the dignity of the 
states. 158 The dignity of the states is, according to the majority, 
offended when the state is called to the bar of an adjudicative 
authority.159 The affront to dignity ostensibly exists irrespective of the 
source of the calling, be it powers under Article I or any other 
157. See South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 315 (1904) ("That [the 
Eleventh Amendment's] motive was not to maintain the sovereignty of a state from the 
degradation supposed to attend a compulsory appearance before the tribunal of the nation 
may be inferred from the terms of the amendment. It does not comprehend controversies 
between two or more states, or between a state and a foreign state. The jurisdiction of the 
court still extends to these cases; and in these a state may still be sued. We must ascribe 
the amendment, then, to some other cause than the dignity of a state."); Cohens v. 
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821) ("That its motive was not to maintain the 
sovereignty of a State from the degradation supposed to attend a compulsory appearance 
before the tribunal of the nation, may be inferred from the terms of the amendment .... 
We must ascribe the amendment, then, to some other cause than the dignity of a State."). 
The current minority of Court Justices adheres to Marshall's Cohens view. See Seminole 
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 96-97 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Cohens, 
19 U.S. at 406-07); P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 
151 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (lambasting the justification as "embarrassingly 
insufficient"). 
158. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002) 
("States, upon ratification of the Constitution, did not consent to become mere 
appendages of the Federal Government."); id. at 760 ("The preeminent purpose of state 
sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their status as 
sovereign entities. The founding generation thought it 'neither becoming nor convenient 
that the several States of the Union, invested with that large residuum of sovereignty 
which had not been delegated to the United States, should be summoned as defendants to 
answer the complaints of private persons."'); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) 
("The generation that designed and adopted our federal system considered immunity from 
private suits central to sovereign dignity .... "); id. at 749-50 (discussing the indignity of 
coercing unwilling states to appear before a judicial tribunal); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 
58 (explaining that state sovereign immunity serves "to avoid the indignity of subjecting a 
State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the insistence of private parties") 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. at 146; In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 
443, 505 (1887) ("The very object and purpose of the eleventh amendment were to 
prevent the indignity of subjecting a state to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at 
the instance of private parties. It was thought to be neither becoming nor convenient that 
the several states of the Union, invested with that large residuum of sovereignty which had 
not been delegated to the United States, should be summoned as defendants to answer to 
complaints of private persons, whether citizens of other states or aliens, or that the course 
of their public policy and the administration of their public affairs should be subject to and 
controlled by the mandates of judicial tribunals, without their consent, and in favor of 
individual interests."). 
159. The Court has used the dignity rationale sweepingly. See, e.g., Federal Mar., 535 
U.S. 743 (barring an adjudicative proceeding against a state before an executive agency on 
the grounds that the forced appearance offended the state's dignity); Alden, 527 U.S. at 
748-49 (explaining that the states' dignity is offended by being coerced into appearing 
before their own courts). 
754 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 29:4 
Article, so long as it is a federal source. 160 
Finally, the Court has often justified its state sovereign immunity 
stance on the recognition that other safeguards exist for state 
compliance with the law, such as the good faith of the states to abide 
by the law, the chance that a state might consent to suit, the federal 
government's ability to sue for enforcement, Section 5 private 
enforcement, suits brought by other states, and Ex parte Young. 161 
There is no reason to think that these safeguards are less effective 
with respect to non-Article I decrees.162 
Like the War Powers analysis, I am sympathetic to the powerful 
arguments that certain non-Article I clauses, such as the Treaty 
Clause,163 might provide the federal government with abrogation 
authority.164 The Treaty Clause, for example, exhibits a stark pro-
federal, anti-state balance similar to that inherent in the War Powers 
Clauses.165 It is also arguably beyond the reach of Seminole Tribe 
160. There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution about protecting the dignity of the 
states. Ironically, then, the justification cannot be tethered to a particular part of the 
Constitution and circumvented by resorting to other parts. 
161. See Federal Mar., 535 U.S. 743; Alden, 527 U.S. at 755-57, Seminole Tribe, 517 
U.S. at 7l n.14. 
162. To be sure, commentators have been critical of the sufficiency of these additional 
safeguards. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 138 (arguing that governmental agencies have 
neither the resources nor the motivation to combat state infractions at a level equal to that 
of individual plaintiffs). To the extent these arguments have weight, however, they do not 
necessarily have more weight with respect to non-Article I laws. In any case, it could be 
argued that the more nationally important state compliance is, the more likely these other 
enforcement mechanisms will be employed. 
163. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators 
present concur .... "). 
164. Some commentators have concluded that the treaty power is subject to the 
Court's state sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Vazquez, supra note 23, at 715; Mitchell N. 
Berman, R. Anthony Reese, Ernest A. Young, State Accountability for Violations of 
Intellectual Property Rights: How to "Fix" Florida Prepaid (And How Not To), 79 TEX. L. 
REV. 1037, 1188-94 (2001); Jean 0. Melious, Enforcing the Endangered Species Act 
Against the States, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 605, 657-58 (2001). Others 
have suggested the contrary. See, e.g., Cory Eichhorn, Comment, Eleventh Amendment 
Immunity Jurisprudence in an Era of Globalization: The Tension between State Sovereign 
Rights and Federal Treaty Obligations, 32 INTER-AM. L. REV. 523 (2001); PeterS. Menell, 
Economic Implications of State Sovereign Immunity from Infringement of Federal 
Intellectual Property Rights, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1399, 1460-64 (2000); John O'Connor, 
Note, Taking TRIPS to the Eleventh Amendment: The Aftermath of the College Savings 
Cases, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1003, 1031-40 (2000). 
165. The states are prohibited by the Constitution from entering into treaties. See U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or 
Confederation .... "). And it is widely recognized that the states gave up much of their 
sovereignty to the federal government in the arena of foreign affairs. See Zschernig v. 
Summer 2002] METES AND BOUNDS 755 
because it is housed in Article II, not Article 1.166 Furthermore, the 
Treaty Clause's requirement of consent of both a supermajority of 
Senators and the President provides internal structural federalism 
safeguards;167 consequently, the exercise of the treaty power might not 
need an additional state sovereign immunity safeguard. Also, the 
desire for state compliance with treaties is arguably greater than that 
for statutes168 and, in any case, was certainly of paramount concern to 
the Framers. 169 Finally, the Court has held, in Missouri v. Holland,170 
Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (developing a dormant foreign affairs power). Professor Peter 
Menell suggests that because the states ceded much of their sovereignty with respect to 
foreign affairs, domestic cases such as Seminole Tribe and its progeny do not support state 
sovereign immunity in the face of a treaty. See Menell, supra note 164164, at 1461 n.240 
("States possessed sovereignty with regard to domestic affairs (as would be relevant to the 
Commerce Clause and the Patent Clause), but not foreign affairs. These powers have 
always resided at the national level. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to read 
Florida Prepaid as precluding Congress from abrogating the States' Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity under its treaty or foreign relation powers."). While this position is by 
no means indefensible, it unjustifiably conflates state sovereign immunity with all other 
attributes of state sovereignty. The position more aligned with the Court's recent opinions 
is that the states, while ceding much of their sovereign regulatory authority over foreign 
affairs to the federal government, did not cede that part of their sovereignty which enables 
them to resist suits by private individuals, even in the face of a national foreign affairs 
power. As the Court has reiterated, it is not dispositive that a power resides exclusively in 
the hands of the federal government. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 
U.S. 743 (2002); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996). 
166. See Robert Knowles, Starbucks and the New Federalism: The Court's Answer to 
Globalization, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 735, 740 (2001) ("The inclusion of the Treaty Clause 
within Article II gives it special significance: it provides a unique and independent grant of 
power to the federal government."). 
167. Structural federalism safeguards include equal state suffrage in the Senate, the 
Senate supermajority requirement, and the Electoral College. As originally conceived, the 
first two requirements ostensibly safeguarded state interests because senators were 
selected by the state legislatures. Now, of course, these protections have been winnowed 
by the Seventeenth Amendment, which eliminated state selection of senators in favor of 
direct election by the people. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. Nevertheless, the modern Court 
has relied upon these federalism protections to restrict state sovereignty in the Tenth 
Amendment context. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 
n.ll (1985). 
168. See Vazquez, supra note 23, at 729-30. One nation's breach of a treaty provision 
entitles non-breaching nations to void the treaty. See THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 280 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (James Madison) ("It is an established doctrine on the subject 
of treaties, that all the articles are mutually conditions of each other; that a breach of any 
one article is a breach of the whole treaty; and that a breach committed by either of the 
parties, absolves the others, and authorizes them, if they please, to pronounce the compact 
violated and void."); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199,261 (1796) (Iredell, J.) ("It is a 
part of the law of nations, that if a treaty be violated by one party, it is at the option of the 
other party, if innocent, to declare, in consequence of the breach, that the treaty is void."). 
169. See THE FEDERALIST No.3, at 42-45 (John Jay)(Ciinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see 
also Vazquez, supra note 155, at 1102-03. 
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that Congress could implement a treaty without transgressing the 
Tenth Amendment even though the implementing statute was not 
authorized under any enumerated power.171 
Despite the appeal of some of these points, I believe the current 
majority would not permit treaties to override state sovereign 
immunity.172 Aside from the reasons I have already articulated that 
cover the Treaty Clause and the rest of the original Constitution, 
several other reasons specific to treaties lend support to that position. 
There is a contextual argument against recognizing the Treaty 
Clause as containing abrogation authority. After the present version 
of the Eleventh Amendment was introduced in the Senate, Senator 
Albert Gallatin moved to amend the resolution to exempt "cases 
arising under treaties, made under the authority of the United States" 
from the Amendment's circumscription of Article III.173 The proposal 
was rejected, which could indicate that the Eleventh Amendment, 
and thus state sovereign immunity, was not intended to be susceptible 
to the Treaty Clause.174 
Historical evidence demonstrates that treaties were not 
understood to be mechanisms for circumventing states' rights. At the 
Convention, Edmund Randolph stated: "[N)either the life nor 
property of any citizen, nor the particular right of any state, can be 
affected by a treaty."175 Thomas Jefferson wrote later that the treaty 
power could not supercede "the rights reserved to the states; for 
170. 252 u.s. 416 (1920). 
171. See id. at 432 ("To answer this question it is not enough to refer to the Tenth 
Amendment, reserving the powers not delegated to the United States, because by Article · 
2, Section 2, the power to make treaties is delegated expressly, and by Article 6 treaties 
made under the authority of the United States, along with the Constitution and laws of the 
United States made in pursuance thereof, are declared the supreme law of the land. If the 
treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article 1, 
Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government."). 
172. Several lower courts agree. See, e.g., Atl. Legal States Found. v. Babbit, 83 F. 
Supp. 2d 344 (N.D.N.Y. 2000). 
173. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 30 (1794). 
174. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 735 (1999) ("Congress' refusal to modify the 
text of the Eleventh Amendment to create an exception to sovereign immunity for cases 
arising under treaties ... suggests the States' sovereign immunity was understood to 
extend beyond state-law causes of action."). Of course, it is also possible that the 
amendment was rejected for other reasons, such as a preference for a total repeal of 
diversity jurisdiction under Article III, see James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: 
An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1362 
(1998), or a belief that the additional language was unnecessary, see Atascadero State 
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 287 n.40 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
175. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 33, at 469,504 (Edmund Randolph). 
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surely the President and Senate cannot do by treaty what the whole 
government is interdicted from doing in any way."176 Despite their 
fear that the states might resist treaty obligations, the Framers 
understood the treaty power to be limited by federalism concerns. 
The Court itself has recognized that the Treaty Power is limited 
by federalism considerations.177 Treaties must be "not inconsistent 
with the nature of our government and the relation between the 
States and the United States,"178 and that the treaty power covers all 
matters "which are consistent with the nature of our institutions, and 
the distribution of powers between the general and state 
governments."179 In Reid v. Covert/80 a plurality of the Court 
explained: 
It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those who 
created the Constitution, as well as those who were responsible 
for the Bill of Rights-let alone alien to our entire 
constitutional history and tradition-to construe Article VI as 
permitting the United States to exercise power under an 
international agreement without observing constitutional 
prohibitions . . . . The prohibitions of the Constitution were 
designed to apply to all branches of the National Government 
and they cannot be nullified by the Executive or by the 
Executive and the Senate combined.181 
Missouri v. Holland182 is consistent with the reasoning in Reid. 
Justice Holmes explicitly acknowledged that the treaty in that case 
was not limited by the passive Tenth Amendment.183 He was careful 
176. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice: For the Use of the 
Senate of the United States (1812), reprinted in JEFFERSON'S PARLIAMENTARY WRITINGS 
at 421(Wilber S. Howell ed., 1988). 
177. Even Justice Holmes in Holland disavowed a limitless treaty power. See Missouri 
v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) ("We do not mean to imply that there are no 
qualifications to the treaty-making power; but they must be ascertained in a different 
way."). 
178. Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211,243 (1872). 
179. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 569 (1840). 
180. 354 u.s. 1 (1957). 
181. Reid, 354 U.S. at 17. Although only four Justices in Reid joined this particular 
language, Justice Frankfurter joined the proposition that neither treaties nor their 
implementing legislation could trump express constitutional rights. /d. at 41 (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring). Other cases express similar language. See, e.g., Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 
258, 267 (1890) ("It would not be contended that [the treaty power] extends so far as to 
authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the government or 
in that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter, 
without its consent."). 
182. 252 u.s. 416 (1920). 
183. /d. at 434; U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United 
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not to imply that the treaty power permitted what was otherwise 
affirmatively prohibited by the Constitution. 1H4 The distinction is 
critical. The current Court's conception of state sovereign immunity 
does not radiate from the Tenth Amendment,1s5 although it has been 
so misinterpreted.186 Rather, according to the Court, state sovereign 
immunity is an affirmative-and express, in the case of the Eleventh 
Amendment-limitation on judicial power. Consequently, a treaty-
sovereign immunity case would fall more appropriately under Reid 
than Holland. Under Reid, the treaty power cannot override such 
constitutional prohibitions as state sovereign immunity. 187 Indeed, the 
current majority has already intimated that state sovereign immunity 
shields states from treaty claims.188 
Additionally, permitting the government to abrogate through 
treaties, but not statutes, would work a number of paradoxes in both 
theory and practice. Statutes and treaties stand on equal footing, 189 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people."). The text of the Tenth Amendment affirmatively grants 
nothing; it is a tautological confirmation of the obvious. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 
100, 124 (1941). 
184. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 433-34 ("The treaty in question does not contravene any 
prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution. The only question is whether it is 
forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment."). 
185. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) ("The 
principle of state sovereign immunity enshrined in our constitutional framework, however, 
is not rooted in the Tenth Amendment."). One commentator has suggested that the state 
sovereignty principles enshrined in the Tenth Amendment should yield to federal foreign 
affairs authorities such as the treaty power. See Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to Be a 
Nation? Federal Power vs. "States' Rights" in Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1277 
(1999). Whether or not persuasive, this argument does not control the question of state 
sovereign immunity, which neither derives from, nor is confined by, the Tenth 
Amendment. Thus, the restrictions on the Tenth Amendment do not necessarily translate 
to limit state sovereign immunity. 
186. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 761 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("There is no 
evidence that the Tenth Amendment constitutionalized a concept of sovereign immunity 
as inherent in the notion of statehood .... "). 
187. Commentators have objected that the right at issue in Reid was an individual 
right, as opposed to a state right, see, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 185, at 1300 (noting that the 
right at issue in Reid was the individual right to a trial by jury), but it is doubtful that the 
current majority would see this distinction as significant. See Coil. Sav. Bank v. Fla. 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 682 (1999) ("State sovereign 
immunity, no less thim the right to trial by jury in criminal cases, is constitutionally 
protected."). 
188. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377 (1998) (per curiam) (suggesting that 
Paraguay's claims against a state for a treaty violation would be barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment). 
189. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("By the Constitution a treaty 
is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both 
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and one can override the other. 190 If state sovereign immunity 
extended only to Article I, a treaty could override state sovereign 
immunity, but a subsequent statute could only reduce-as opposed to 
expand-the states' exposure. This situation is not an impossibility, 
but it is rather peculiar191 and could work difficulties in practice.'92 
Also, in the event the United States ratifies a non-self-executing 
treaty193 requiring state suability, Congress would be unable to 
implement (and the courts unable to enforce) that requirement, even 
though the nation would still be bound by the treaty conditions.194 
Lastly, the emergence of an international community and global 
identity have blurred many of the demarcations the Founders initially 
envisioned between treaties and statutes. Today, Congress regularly 
enacts statutes with ramifications far beyond domestic borders,195 and 
congressional-executive agreements196 have somewhat usurped the 
are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy 
is given to either over the other."); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) 
("Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be 
regarded in Courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature .... "). 
190. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 376 ("We have held 'that an Act of Congress ... is on full 
parity with a treaty, and that when a statute which is subsequent in time is inconsistent 
with a treaty, the statute to the extent of [a] conflict renders the treaty null."') (quoting 
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957)); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) ("In 
short, we are of [the] opinion that, so far as a treaty made by the United States with any 
foreign nation can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, 
it is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or 
repeal."). 
191. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 18 ("It would be completely anomalous to say that a treaty 
need not comply with the Constitution when such an agreement can be overriden by a 
statute that must conform to that instrument."). 
192. For example, Congress might desire to alter the treaty abrogation by narrowing it 
in some aspects but broadening it in others, with the overall effect of reducing state 
exposure. It would be an undecided question whether such an attempt would be 
constitutional. 
193. Treaties can be either self-executing, which are immediately enforceable, or non-
self-executing, which require implementation by congressional statute. Compare Trans 
World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (self-executing), and 
Cook v. United States 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933) (self-executing), with Edye v. Robertson, 
112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (non-self-executing). 
194. This result assumes that implementing statutes are identical to Article I statutes 
for state sovereign immunity purposes. Because both derive their authorization from the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, see Missiouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) and Neely 
v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 121-22 (1901), the assumption is a strong one. 
195. Congress has the power to legislate foreign affairs not covered by its enumerated 
powers, even though the Constitution does not expressly authorize such legislation. See 
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 
u.s. 304, 318 (1936). 
196. Though they circumvent the Senate supermajority requirement of treaties, 
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traditional treaty role. Because international statutes, congressional-
executive agreements, and treaties are used interchangeably as a 
practical matter/97 it would be problematic to differentiate between 
them on state sovereign immunity grounds. The slew of anomalies 
and uncertainties which a treaty exception to state sovereign 
immunity would create stands in the way of the current majority's 
rule-oriented jurisprudence. 
For these reasons, the current majority's understanding of state 
sovereign immunity leaves no room for a treaty exception. Such an 
exception, while supported by some evidence, would enable plaintiffs 
to end-run around one of the Court's favorite state rights. This the 
majority would not sanction. Rather, state sovereign immunity is a 
principle which pervades the entire original Constitution, and nothing 
therein contains the power to override it.198 
C. Amendments 
Having determined that the Court's understanding recognizes 
state sovereign immunity as a limitation on the powers of the federal 
government as conceived in the original Constitution, the question 
remains whether the various Amendments to the Constitution either 
changed the contours of Hamilton's plan for state sovereign immunity 
or provided Congress with certain limited powers to abrogate. 
The Court answered that question in at least one context. 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendmene99 authorizes Congress to 
subject the states to private suit for the purpose of enforcing the 
mandates of that Amendment.200 The Fourteenth Amendment does 
congressional-executive agreements are accorded the same stature as treaties. They are 
both constitutional and supreme with respect to state laws, just as federal statutes and 
treaties are. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937); see generally Bruce 
Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 801 {1995). 
197. In recent years, treaties and congressional-executive agreements have invaded a 
host of domestic and state-province issues. See Knowles, supra note 166, at 749-50. 
198. Professor Bandes argues for a clause-specific state sovereign immunity inquiry, at 
least with respect to the Treaty Power. See Bandes, supra note 23, at 747. Her point is 
that the "plan of the convention" is the pertinent guidepost, and that "it is still necessary 
to determine the current scope of state sovereignty by examining the 'structural principles 
inherent in our system of federalism."' /d. (quoting Jackson, supra note 23, at 1277). I do 
not disagree; I only suggest that a current majority of the Court understands Hamilton's 
rubric to be a structural rule already dispositive of the examination, and that the Court 
would be more willing to rely on that rule than sew together a patchwork quilt of ad hoc 
clause-by-clause analyses. 
199. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 {"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."). 
200. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). 
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so, according to the Court, because it specifically contemplates direct 
congressional regulation of the states201 and dramatically altered the 
federal-state balance of power in favor of the federal government.202 
Based on Fitzpatrick, it is virtually a foregone conclusion that the 
other Amendments with enforcement clauses directed at regulating 
the states203 also provide Congress a limited abrogation power.204 
Indeed, because the Civil War Amendments' shift in the federal-state 
balance is ostensibly still in effect today, any Amendments enacted 
after the Fourteenth would have been ratified on the understanding 
that the federal-state balance of power, and its contingent effects on 
state sovereign immunity, had changed. Thus, any post-Civil War 
Amendment arguably possesses inherent abrogation potential. 
The more interesting question is whether those Amendments 
ratified before the Eleventh Amendment also allow abrogation.205 
Although not a part of the original Constitution, and therefore 
arguably not constrained by the original plan's federalism framework, 
the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791, only a few years after the 
original Constitution took effect and was contemplated well 
beforehand. It is highly improbable that the majority would ascribe 
both to the "profound shock" theory of Chisholm and to. a 
contemporaneous consent to private suits under the first ten 
Amendments. The Court's opinions assume that the balance of 
federal-state power struck by the original Constitution remained 
relatively static until the Civil War Amendments,206 a time period 
201. See id. at 453; see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996) 
("We noted that § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment contained prohibitions expressly 
directed at the States and that § 5 of the Amendment expressly provided that 'The 
Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this 
article."') (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 5). 
202. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455; see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (explaining 
that the Fourteenth Amendment "fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal 
power struck by the Constitution"). 
203. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII,§ 2, XV,§ 2, XIX, XXIV,§ 2, XXVI,§ 2. 
204. See Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 102, 107 n.33 (1996); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other 
Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suit upon the States, 126 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1203, 1228-29 (1978). 
205. I say Eleventh Amendment here because the Thirteenth Amendment, which 
outlaws slavery, is a Civil War Amendment in the same vein as the Fourteenth, and the 
Twelfth Amendment, which merely limits the term of the President, provides no basis for 
a cause of action against a state. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XII. 
206. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65-66 (stating that before the Civil War 
Amendments were adopted, there existed a "pre-existing balance between state and 
federal power achieved by Article III and the Eleventh Amendment"). 
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inclusive of the ratification of the Bill of Rights. This is no great 
surprise. The Bill of Rights originally granted the people various civil 
rights vis-a-vis the federal government but not vis-a-vis the state 
governments.207 Under their original meaning, the pre-Eleventh 
Amendments clearly did not contemplate abrogation of state 
sovereign immunity. 
But the Civil War convinced the nation of the need to curb 
abusive state infringements on individual liberties. The Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified in response, and the Due Process Clause has 
been held to incorporate the following individual rights against state 
infringemeneos the First Amendment's protections of free speech,209 
f 210 f d f bl 211 f . f 1' . 212 d ree press, ree om o assem y; ree exercise o re tgwn, an 
non-establishment;213 the Fourth Amendment's restrictions on 
207. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247-49 (1833) (emphasizing this 
point); see also, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (explicitly restricting "Congress" but nowhere 
mentioning the states). Curiously, the first ten Amendments were originally quite 
defensive of state authority. They permitted states to, for example, establish a state 
church (which some did), while at the same time insulating such establishments from 
intrusion by the federal government by barring Congress from making any law respecting 
an establishment of religion. See Akhil Reed Amar, Hugo Black and the Hall of Fame, 53 
ALA. L. REV. 1221, 1223-24 (2002). 
208. The Due Process Clause is arguably the wrong Clause to incorporate named 
rights against the states. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment-"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States"-by its terms would incorporate all the 
rights of U.S. citizens found in the Bill of Rights and bind the states with them. U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. But the Court in 1873 held that clause virtually powerless. See 
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (16 Wall.) (1873); see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 
489, 521 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that "the Court all but read the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause out of the Constitution"); Stanley Morrison, Does the Fourteenth 
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140, 144 (1949) (proclaiming 
that the Court had rendered the Clause "practically a dead letter"). As a result, the 
burden of impressing civil rights and Reconstruction notions of fairness upon the states 
fell upon the inauspicious Due Process Clause. Revisiting The Slaughter-House Cases' 
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment could 
result in an expanded congressional abrogation power. See William J. Rich, Privileges or 
Immunities: The Missing Link in Establishing Congressional Power to Abrogate State 
Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235 (2001) (arguing that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment creates a broad 
abrogation power). 
209. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 664 (1925); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 
359,368 (1931). 
210. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,707 (1931). 
211. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353,364 (1937). 
212. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
213. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). 
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warrants, searches, and seizures;214 the Fifth Amendment's 
proscriptions against taking property without just compensation,215 
compelled self-incrimination,216 and double-jeopardy;217 the Sixth 
Amendment's rights to a public trial,218 to counsel,219 to confront 
accusers,
220 to a speedy trial,221 to compulsory process,222 and to a jury 
trial;223 and the Eighth Amendment's bans on cruel and unusual 
punishmene24 and excessive bail.225 The Court has also interpreted the 
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause to contain a Fourteenth 
Amendment-type Equal Protection component.226 In each of these 
cases, the Court has defined the protected liberty as a "fundamental 
right" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.227 The only major 
exceptions are the Second Amendment's right to keep and bear arms, 
the Fifth Amendment's grand jury requirement, and the Seventh 
Amendment's preservation of a right to civil trial by jury.228 
Thus, in the wake of the Civil War, the states ratified the 
Fourteenth Amendment and through that act made most of the first 
eight Amendments applicable to themselves. The individual rights 
enshrined in those Amendments and incorporated into the Due 
Process Clause are therefore protectable by Congress through 
abrogation of state sovereign immunity. However, the provisions 
contained in the original Constitution provide no abrogation power.229 
214. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) (Fourth Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961) (exclusionary rule). 
215. Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,241 (1897). 
216. Mallory v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). 
217. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793 (1969). 
218. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948). 
219. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963). 
220. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,403 (1965). 
221. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213,222-23 (1967). 
222. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967). 
223. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
224. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). 
225. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971). 
226. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). 
227. Although the Court has never fully endorsed Justice Hugo Black's bright-line 
theory that the Bill of Rights was "incorporated" into the Fourteenth Amendment, see 
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,68-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), it has very nearly 
reached the same result by categorizing each right individually as "fundamental." 
228. The Third Amendment has not been incorporated either, but it makes few 
appearances in the annals of constitutional law. 
229. Because I have argued that the Fourteenth Amendment permits abrogation 
pursuant to Amendments that were not understood to permit abrogation before the 
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State sovereign immunity, therefore, is inviolable within the confines 
of the original document; outside those confines, however, the tide 
turns, and Congress is empowered to abrogate it in appropriate 
circumstances. 
IV. Conclusion 
I make no intimation of my own views of state sovereign 
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, I take seriously Professor Vicki Jackson's musings 
that the Fourteenth Amendment also may have shifted the federal-state power balance 
with respect to parts of the original Constitution. See Jackson, supra note 23. She argues 
that the Fourteenth Amendment's shift in federal-state power could have expanded 
Congress' Article I enumerated powers to permit abrogation. See id. Indeed, her 
argument generally supports my identification of the abrogation power in Amendments 
antedating the Eleventh Amendment. But I do not believe the current majority would 
sanction its expansion to the original Constitution. 
The Fourteenth Amendment did not affect all of the Constitution's provisions in the same 
way. The Amendment was specifically directed at the unfair and unequal treatment of 
citizens by states. Although the Bill of Rights initially restrained only the federal 
government, it listed those basic individual civil liberties deemed "fundamental" to 
fairness and equality. That those liberties should be made applicable to the states, and 
that Congress was enabled to enact appropriate enforcements in derogation of the 
Eleventh Amendment to sanction the recalcitrant states, is no stretch. It is an entirely 
different matter to read the Fourteenth Amendment as expanding Congress' Article I 
powers, such as the Commerce Clause power, to fit the Fourteenth Amendment's 
purposes. The Commerce Clause simply does not have the same focus as the 
Amendments. Moreover, to permit the expansion of an enumerated power beyond what 
Article I expressly permits would threaten the very concept of limited government to 
which the majority very much adheres. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-
19 (2000); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-22 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 
u.s. 549, 579-80 (1995). 
I therefore do not believe the Court would maintain that the Fourteenth Amendment 
fundamentally changed the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment or expanded parts of 
the original Constitution in ways permitting abrogation. Rather, the Fourteenth poked 
holes in the Eleventh in a very selective way not applicable to the original Constitution. 
Section 5 permits abrogation, despite the Eleventh Amendment and structural principles 
of state sovereign immunity, when necessary to prevent state abridgment of certain 
fundamental rights protected by the Constitution. 
This is not to say that Professor Jackson's theory is neither thought-provoking nor correct. 
I am simply skeptical, as is she, see Jackson, supra note'23, at 1263,1307 n.172, that there 
is much room in the Court's federalism juggernaut for it. Cf Pennsylvania v. Union Gas 
Co., 491 U.S. 1, 42 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The plurality asserts that it is no more 
impossible for provisions of the Constitution adopted concurrently with Article III to 
permit abrogation of state sovereign immunity than it is for provisions adopted 
subsequently. We do not dispute that that is possible, but only that it happened .... An 
interpretation of the original Constitution which permits Congress to eliminate sovereign 
immunity only if it wants to renders the doctrine a practical nullity and is therefore 
unreasonable. The Fourteenth Amendment, on the other hand, was avowedly directed 
against the power of the States, and permits abrogation of their sovereign immunity only 
for a limited purpose.") (italics in original). 
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immunity; rather, my goal is to distill a coherent structural rule for the 
Court's state sovereign immunity jurisprudence. Under that 
understanding, the line between state sovereign immunity and 
abrogation authority is most tenably drawn at the outskirts of the 
original Constitution. There are weaknesses to such a rule-perhaps 
even exceptions.230 But they will be exceptions which prove the 
existence of the rule in the first place. 
230. The obvious exception is Congress' Spending Clause power. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 
8, cl. 1. As I have noted, however, that power is a solicitation of voluntary waiver, not 
forced abrogation. See supra note 18. In that respect, the Spending Clause is the 
"exception" that proves the rule. More intriguing is the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
of Article IV. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled 
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."). That Clause speaks 
directly to the states and restricts state authority in favor of individuals, just as the 
Fourteenth Amendment does. Moreover, Publius, in interpreting the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, suggested that the federal courts should have jurisdiction over 
controversies between citizens and states arising under its dictates. See THE FEDERALIST 
No. 80, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) ("[T]he citizens of each 
State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the several States' ... [i]t will 
follow that ... the national judiciary ought to preside in all cases in which one State or its 
citizens are opposed to another state or its citizens.'"). This statement by Publius is 
extremely revealing. The rule that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the 
privileges and immunities of the several states implies a right for citizens only, not states. 
Thus, in a controversy arising under that rule, only citizens could logically be plaintiffs. 
When Publius then immediately discusses the jurisdiction of the federal courts over such 
controversies, he must necessarily be contemplating jurisdiction over suits brought by 
private citizens against a state. To my knowledge, no one has extensively addressed how 
Article IV itself relates to state sovereign immunity and congressional abrogation. Cf. 
Rich, supra note 208208, at 241-49 (analyzing the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV as support for his principal theory that the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges 
or Immunities Clause creates a broad abrogation power). 
